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Abstract 
This thesis studies the interplay between the pre-existing social structures in rural Cambodia 
and the ‘Identification of Poor Households Programme’. The aim is to comprehend the 
processes and dynamics that people’s actions give rise to when they accommodate and adapt 
the external development intervention into the realities they live in. A focus is put on the 
influence of local power structures on the adaptation of the programme. To identify and 
research these dynamics, an ethnographic approach is applied. The analysis indicates that the 
community's former experiences with development interventions, a hierarchical social order, 
self-identification as inferior citizen, and related to that, certain local social norms influence 
the way the programme is adapted by the community. The results show that the programme 
design’s underlying conceptualisation of power is too simplistic, as it addresses only 
formalised decision-making processes, but neglects power exercised ‘behind the scenes’ or in 
form of internalised domination.  
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1. Introduction 
This research has been a journey. It started with an internship in a development project on 
social health protection in Cambodia implemented by the German Society for International 
Cooperation (GIZ).
1
 This was the first time for me in this country. Since the start of the 
United Nations’ mission in Cambodia (UNTAC) in 1993 numerous development agencies 
have entered the country and set up their projects. According to the Cambodian Council for 
Development
2
 up to date 19 governmental bi-lateral partners and 14 multi-lateral partners 
(like UN bodies) are implementing various development programmes (Council for the 
Development of Cambodia, 2015a). The non-governmental sector is equally busy with 530 
national and international NGOs registered, currently implementing over 600 programmes 
throughout country (Council for the Development of Cambodia, 2015b). Thereby, Cambodia 
ranks second after Rwanda on the total number of NGOs active in a country (Strangio, 
2014:7).  
Within this jungle of development programmes the ‘Identification of Poor Households 
Programme’ (IDPoor programme) was designed to facilitate poverty-oriented planning by 
shedding some light on the poverty situation in rural Cambodia. The objective is to categorise 
all households in the countryside into different poverty categories, based on their socio-
economic situation. This is supposed to improve targeting of services and development 
assistance for the poorest households in the communities. The programme it is supposed to be 
used as the main planning tool by the different development agencies active in the country 
(Ministry of Planning, 2015). 
The IDPoor programme captured my interest as I encountered anecdotic evidence 
according to which the project fosters social exclusion and stigmatisation of the identified 
poor during my time in Phnom Penh. Even though, the technical aspects of the programme 
had been scrutinised by the World Bank in an unpublished study (World Bank, n.d.), no 
research regarding the impact of the project on the communities had ever been conducted. 
Hence, an explorative research design was chosen to investigate the rumours more 
systematically by studying how the IDPoor programme influences the local social structures. 
Yet, throughout the fieldwork, it became apparent that rather the social structures influence 
                                                          
1
 GIZ is the main implementing agency of the German governmental development projects. 
2 
The government institution coordinating the development assistance between the royal Government of 
Cambodia, development partners and NGOs. 
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the programme, not vice versa. As my understanding of the local situation shifted, the focus 
of the research changed as well. The fieldwork indicated that the unfolding of the project
3
 was 
affected by intersecting perceptions of local leadership and citizenship, acceptance or 
resistance to domination, and the communities’ experiences with former development 
programmes. The study scrutinises these processes by exploring the ways in which the 
IDPoor programme is adapted and shaped by the community’s pre-existing local power 
structures. This reflexive approach also guided the development of the research questions and 
the theoretical framework, which were constantly refined along the process of making sense 
of the material. 
1.1. Research Questions 
Once in the field, my empirical material pinpointed to the need to apply a theoretical 
framework that allows for analysing how actors can exercise power in different ways to 
influence decision-making processes, as well as how domination creates willing subordination 
and hidden resistance. Even though power forms a central concept for understanding societies 
(Haugaard and Clegg, 2009:1), it is regarded as “one of the most badly theorised concepts in 
development studies” (Nuijeten, 2005:1). The study addresses these shortcomings by 
illustrating how – when designing a programme – a narrow and simplistic understanding of 
power can facilitate elite capture and the reproduction of (unequal) power relations. Hence, 
this work contributes to a more thorough understanding of the complex processes that shape 
the adaptation of development interventions by the local realities they encounter. Specifically, 
I illustrate how the concept of power constitutes an important aspect in understanding these 
processes. The main research question therefore reads as follows: How does the Kaoh Moan 
community adapt the ‘Identification of Poor Households’ intervention to its pre-existing 
social structures? 
In order to analyse this, the following sub-questions will be addressed:  
1. How are the communities’ perceptions of the intervention related to their historical 
experiences with development programmes?  
2. How are dimensions of power essential in understanding the process of adaptation? 
3. How do the local power structures limit and enable villagers’ actions when engaging 
with the IDPoor intervention? 
                                                          
3
 Within this study the terms programme and project are used interchangeably.  
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1.2. Disposition 
In the next chapter the relevant literature, the background of the case under study and the 
setting of the fieldwork is presented.  
The section on methodology clarifies the study’s underlying theory of science and 
presents different stages of the ethnographic work. The decision to conduct an ethnographic 
study entails more than just applying a certain research design, which will be elaborated on 
throughout the section.  
The theoretical framework, presented in chapter 4, builds on Long’s conceptualisation of 
development programmes as external interventions, which allows scrutinising emergent forms 
of interactions and strategies that the intervention gives rise to. In order to theorise how these 
interactions are limited and enabled by power structures Giddens’ duality of structure is 
introduced. His idea of power as transformative capacity forms the basis for applying Lukes’ 
three-dimensional concept of power. In order to present and analyse conflicting local 
strategies, Scott’s concept of hidden resistance is introduced as a complementary model of 
explanation to Lukes’ idea of internalised domination.   
In chapter 5 the material gathered during my fieldwork is thematically presented. I cover 
four identified themes which represent the community’s experiences and perceptions of the 
IDPoor programme and the local structures that shape its adaptation.  
Within the analysis, I theorise the various interplays through which the community 
adapted the two participatory features of the project. Accounting for the ways in which the 
village chief was able to broaden and consolidate his power I illuminate the 
interconnectedness of power exercised in different dimensions. Moreover, villagers’ 
understanding of leadership and self-ascription as citizens restricts their engagement with the 
programme. Yet, only some members of the community have internalised the domination, 
whereas others tactically comply to benefit from the programme while pursuing non-
confrontative strategies of resistance. 
In chapter 7, the implications for a more complex account of power when designing 
programmes are represented. I scrutinise in how far the IDPoor project facilitates the 
reproduction of unequal power structures. This thesis ends by emphasising the need for better 
contextualisation of development activities and highlighting areas of further research.  
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2. Background of the Case and Context 
This chapter first discusses previous relevant studies and illustrates academic debates in 
order to position the study in the overall research context. Afterwards, the IDPoor programme 
is outlined, whereby a focus is put on the projects’ participatory features, as they form the 
core of the later analysis. Afterwards, the local setting – Kaoh Moan village4 – is described in 
order to illuminate the context in which the IDPoor project is implemented and to provide 
background information for the reader to be able to situate the findings in a broader context.  
2.1. Literature Overview  
In this work the ‘traditional’ three-stage research process (read - do - write) was dropped 
in favour of a mixed approach whereby reading, doing and writing was combined right from 
the beginning. This is common in ethnography and allows to gradually piece together a study 
which is interesting, relevant and doable (Crang and Cook, 2004:2). Therefore, this review 
discusses the literature I have read and reflected on throughout the research process which 
helped me to form an understanding of my study and to position my research.  
Previous research shows that a discrepancy between the expected outcomes of 
development programmes and their actual impacts and consequences exists. One identified 
reason is the dismissal of the local social-cultural structures when ‘outside experts’ design 
development programmes. Li’s (2007) brilliant historical study of the Indonesian highland 
shows how the causes of underdevelopment were rendered technical and non-political by the 
different development agencies engaging in the area. Obviously, if agencies conclude they 
cannot tailor an adequate project to tackle the causes of underdevelopment their legitimacy is 
threatened. Thus, social relations and political processes are framed, problematised and 
rearranged in alignment with outsiders’ expert design to reaffirm the own position (Li, 2007). 
Arce and Long (1992) focus more on the dynamics between development experts and the 
‘target group’ when researching the intersections of different forms of knowledge between 
Mexican peasants and bureaucrats in a rural development programme. Analysing how their 
knowledge production is relational to social, cultural and situational factors, the authors trace 
the limited success of the programme back to the failure to consider and bridge these different 
knowledge forms (Arce and Long, 1992). Advancing this argument, Nuijeten (2005) claims 
the already existing (informal) organising practices within the communities have to be taken 
                                                          
4
 Different English spelling variants of the name of the village exist. In this work the transcription from the 
IDPoor Data base is used for the village, the commune and the district. 
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into consideration when designing external projects. By researching a natural resource 
management programme, she contests the idea that establishing a community-organisation, 
equipping with democratic decision-making processes and transparent procedures, will 
automatically foster empowerment of the whole community. Instead the organisation will be 
accommodated and shaped by the fractured context and does not lead to more power and 
freedom of the excluded per se (Nuijeten, 2005).  
Yet, not only has the neglect of essential structural aspects of the different contexts limited 
programmes’ progress and impact. Related to that is the (mis)representation of the ‘target 
group’ of the programme as passive, traditional and backwards oriented and a naive 
understanding of how local people adapt and shape development activities. Various studies 
highlight, how people negotiate, manipulate or resist projects as active agents. Results vary 
from refusing responsibilising participation (Gardner, 2012) and adapting front-stage 
behaviour for the development agencies (Mosse 2010; Rossi, 2004) to monopolising or side-
tracking aid opportunities (Olivier de Sardan, 2005; Moore, 2005; Villerreal, 1994). Villerreal 
(1994) highlights how women strategic align or resist certain features of a programme 
fostering women’s economic inclusion. Her results indicate that the women adopted parts they 
regarded useful from their individual perspective (not all women valued the same parts of the 
project), while overall keeping their own particular objectives (Villerreal, 1994). Similarly, by 
reflecting on years of anthropological research in West Africa Olivier de Sardan (2005) finds 
that “development packages are never completely adapted by the target group, but picked 
apart and adopted selectively” and that these “appropriation [...] [often] assumes frames which 
run counter the project’s objective and methods” (Olivier de Sardan, 2005:145). Hence, ‘the 
target group’ cannot be regarded as passive, static entity but rather as a diverse group of actors 
with different rationales which appropriate the programme and influence the way it will 
unfold. 
As a response to the limited success and failure to trigger and control development 
researchers and practitioners explored alternative approaches to development. Thereby, 
participation became the silver bullet to development throughout the 1990s and was integrated 
into the mainstream developmental discourse. Through the participatory turn the focus shifted 
towards the importance of local-level history, geographies and socio-cultural circumstances in 
order to understand community level development (Biggs, 2014). Hence, the aspects the 
former studies identified as root-causes for unsuccessful development activities were 
addressed. Yet, scrutinising these new participatory programmes, many studies identified a 
 Stefanie Licht 
Masters of Science in Development Studies 
Graduate School & Department of Sociology 
 
6 
 
too simplistic and technical understanding of participation (for example: Gomez et al, 2010; 
Hoben 1995; Lewis and Mosse, 2006; Long and Long, 1992; Oliver de Sardan, 2005; 
Rhoades, 2006). Exemplary is Biggs and Sharp’s (2004) research of the World Bank’s 
attempt to integrate indigenous knowledge and local participation into their strategies. They 
conclude that the Bank’s approach framed local knowledge as little more than a list of 
technical, easy identifiable forms of knowledge, which were not understood as embedded in 
wider socio-cultural and historical structures. Thereby, the Bank’s conceptualisation of local 
knowledge did not foster fundamental changes within the institutions top-down discourse 
(Biggs and Sharp, 2004). Cook and Kothari (2001) go as far as to label participation the new 
tyranny in development studies, claiming participatory programmes “facilitate illegitimate or 
unjust exercises of power” (Cook and Kothari, 2001:4). According to the authors, this is based 
on a naive understanding of local communities as homogeneous, static and harmonious 
entities, whereby power relations and conflicts between different interest groups are 
concealed (ibid.; also see Li 2007). Hence, the idea of bottom-up participatory development 
projects became detached from its anthropological claim to draw attention to actor’s practices, 
strategies and contextual constraints (Bierschenk, Chauveau, Olivier de Sardan, 2002). In 
sum, the research indicates a miss-match exists between the insights thorough ethnographic 
research could offer for development programmes, and development practitioner’s use of 
formalised participatory tools (Gomez et al, 2010; Mosse, 2013; Olivier de Sardan, 2005).   
The discussed studies highlight the failure of development programmes to adequately 
reflect structural as well as agency-related characteristics of development settings in their 
designs. Even though the participatory turn in development was expected to address these 
shortcomings, the review indicates that its instrumentalisation for mainstream development 
programmes fails its purpose. This study positions itself within the broader academic claim 
for a systematic (re)engagement of ethnography in development studies. Not just by applying 
‘ethnographic tools’ to imitate participation and context-sensitivity, but through research 
thoroughly grounded in people’s life-worlds.  
This study contributes to this by researching how the IDPoor programme interacts with 
and is adapted by the context it is introduced to. As mentioned in the introduction, the 
programme has not been researched yet even though it is supposed to function as a basis for 
many other development activities throughout Cambodia. I argue Giddens’ theory of 
structuration offers a valuable and so far underestimated approach in development studies to 
understand the interplay between structure and agency when new programmes enter a 
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development setting. Through focusing on the participatory features of the IDPoor 
programme and how they are shaped by the power structures in Kaoh Moan, the study 
contributes to a better understanding of the multiple ways in which power influences the 
unfolding, progress and effects of development projects. 
2.2. The Identification of Poor Households Programme 
2.2.1. Programme Rationale and Objective 
The ‘Identification of Poor Households Programme’ is a national development 
programme managed by the Cambodian Ministry of Planning with the objective to “officially 
mandate National Standardised Procedures for Identification of Poor Households and to 
achieve their implementation throughout Cambodia” (Ministry of Planning, 2015). This 
means, based on certain socio-economic criteria the poverty level of Cambodian households 
will be assessed and a poverty status
5
 will be assigned. The identified poor households obtain 
a personalised Equity Card, which grants access to different development services available in 
that region. The Ministry of Planning states a number of potential benefits, like the provision 
of free or discounted health care, financial support for poor pupils and students or allocation 
of land concessions to the poor. To date, mainly the provision of public health care is 
connected to data of the IDPoor programme (ibid.). The programme has only been 
implemented in rural areas, but an expansion to cover urban areas is envisioned (GIZ,2015). 
The purpose of the programme is to “directly target services and development assistance to 
the poorest households in a village in order to help lift them out of poverty” (Ministry of 
Planning, 2015). Overall, the government of Cambodia “intends to make IDPoor the primary 
targeting methodology across all social protection schemes” (ibid.), which highlights the 
importance of the programme as a foundation for social services and other development 
projects. So far, cooperation partners have included the European Commission, the former 
Australian development organisation AusAID, the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) 
and GIZ. From 2015 on the Ministry of Planning intends to carry out the procedure 
independently using exclusively state funds.  
In regard to the research interest this study focuses on the implementation of the project 
on the local level and how it is shaped and adapted by local structures. Hence, the 
                                                          
5
 Three categories exist: Level 1 Poor households (the extreme poor), Level 2 Poor households (poor), and non-
poor households (Ministry of Planning, 2015a). 
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participatory features of the programme design, with which communities directly interact, will 
be explored in the following chapter. 
2.2.2.  The Participatory Features of the Programme  
The IDPoor programme has a clear participatory approach, as the categorisation of 
households “is based on transparency and participation” (GIZ, n.d.) and relies on villagers’ 
perception of poverty and their local knowledge to identify who is poor within their 
communities (ibid.). In order to achieve this, two participatory features are integrated into the 
design.  
The first is the constitution of a Village Representative Group (VRG) as the overall 
responsible body for implementing the IDPoor programme on the local level. The groups’ 
responsibilities range from jointly deciding which households shall be interviewed and 
conducting these assessments, to dealing with objections and requests made by the villagers in 
regard to the categorisation (Ministry of Planning, 2008:8). The score each household gets 
assigned, based on the questionnaire, serves only as an indication for the poverty 
categorisation. Sometimes special circumstances (like illness of a family member, crop loss or 
a high number of young children) impact the poverty status of a household, but are not 
adequately reflected in the questionnaire score. The VRG can consult on such cases and 
jointly assign another poverty category to the household (Ministry of Planning, 2012:4). 
Hence, the VRG is not just responsible for technical aspects of establishing a list of poor 
households, but constitutes an active and influential actor in the process of discussion, 
reflection and modification of the categorisation of households. Every VRG consists of at 
least five members of the community that are publicly elected by all villagers. Additionally, 
the implementation manual of the IDPoor programme demands certain composition criteria, 
like the inclusion of women (Ministry of Planning, 2008:7-8). Through the public election it 
is ensured that the group acts independently from local power structures or conflicts within 
the village and is accepted and legitimised by the community. Thus, the VRG not just reflects 
the participatory principle of the programme. It also constitutes a control mechanism of the 
categorisation process to enhance transparency and accuracy of the implementation. This is in 
line with one main objective of the activity: “to reduce conflicts in the communities due to the 
shared acceptance of the categorisation” (ibid.:1). 
The second participatory feature of the programme’s design is the village consultation 
meeting on the first draft list of poor households. The meeting constitutes a platform for the 
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whole community to discuss and give feedback to the preliminary categorisation of 
households done by the VRG. The aim is to reach consensus regarding the categorisation 
within the community. Additionally to the meeting, villagers can submit objections and 
requests to the VRG (or the Commune Council directly) up to seven days after the meeting. 
The suggestions of the villagers are reviewed by the VRG and they must find a joint decision 
for each household in relation to the objections or requests from the villagers (Ministry of 
Planning, 2008:22-26). Overall, this element of the design advances legitimacy and 
acceptance of the programme within the community while fostering a transparent 
implementation and gives the villagers the opportunity to take part in the implementation 
process. 
2.3. Description of the Setting – Kaoh Moan Village 
Within this chapter the setting in which the case study was conducted is presented. This 
does not constitute an ‘objective account’. Rather, the text and all following accounts of the 
village or its inhabitants involve interpretation. Hence, describing Kaoh Moan means framing 
and representing the village in a way I consider important for understanding the gathered 
material and the overall context of the study. 
The fieldwork was conducted in Kaoh Moan village, in Kaoh Andaet district in Takeo 
province. The map in the appendix indicates the location of the village within Takeo province. 
There are 126 households and around 560 to 580 people currently living in the village. A 
rather big number of households were female-headed during the time of the fieldwork, as a lot 
of men work outside the village on construction sites throughout the dry season. In March 
2015 eight households were landless, mostly due to failure to pay back loans.  
The village is located approximately one hour by motorbike from the nearest market in 
Thom Loab. Thus, traders regularly come to the village to buy and sell products. The village 
itself has no market – only three little kiosks with a very limited variety of products, mostly 
sweets and gasoline, exist. It takes around 15 minutes by foot to walk from one end of village 
to the other along the main street. The houses are mainly traditional rural Khmer houses made 
out of wood with an open ground floor. Most households in the village have electricity and a 
television, and around one third has a toilet in the back yard (in total there are 45 toilets in the 
village). Three families own a car and around 60 motorbikes are in the village. There are two 
public ponds and approximately 20 pumps, out of which three are public. 
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Nearly all families make a living from cultivating wet- and/or dry-land rice. An irrigation 
system is partly developed, which reaches some, but not all fields. Farming becomes more 
and more uneconomical, as prices for fertilizers increased while – at the same time – rice 
prices dropped. The fieldwork was conducted after an unstable monsoon and therefore a very 
low crop yield. Villagers complained they even have to buy the water this year, which makes 
farming even less profitable. Therefore, in many families at least one member works outside 
the village and sends money back home. Young women work mainly in garment factories, 
men on construction sides. Additionally, (illegal) labour migration to Thailand is common, as 
various families cannot secure their livelihood from farming anymore.   
The village has a long history with the IDpoor programme. It was implemented for the 
first time in 2003 through the local NGO ‘Buddhism for Health’. In 2007, the Cambodian 
government resumed responsibility for the programme as part of a nation-wide upscaling. 
Since then the programme is implemented through local government structures and now Kaoh 
Moan faces its seventh round of implementation. The process of implementation changed 
throughout the years, the current practices have been in place since 2010. The categorisation 
is redone around every third year, to keep track of livelihood changes of the families in the 
village. 
 
3. Methodology and Research Design  
This chapter explains the study’s underlying theory of science and the implications of an 
ethnographic approach. From an ethnographic perspective, what is found out is inherently 
connected to how it is found out. Hence, ‘the findings’ and ‘the analysis’ cannot be separated 
from the methods used to gather the empirical material (Emerson, Fretz and Shaw, 1995:11). 
Therefore, these methods and methodological assumptions should not be ignored, but ought to 
be reflected on, which I will do in this chapter. 
I decided to conduct a case study, as it is suitable for researching events and processes 
within their context, whereby sense can be made of seemingly unrelated phenomena. 
Grounded in sensitivity towards the complexity of the social world, case studies produce rich 
material and in-depth analysis, thus contributing to a holistic understanding of the phenomena 
under study (Hasselskog, 2009:40). Thereby, the adaptation of the IDPoor programme can be 
viewed as a multifaceted process, allowing to research how different social dynamics enable, 
limit and enforce each other.  
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As I do not speak Khmer a local research assistant was hired, who accompanied me to 
Kaoh Moan and worked as my translator. I will reflect on the implications of cross-cultural 
cross-language research in chapter 3.4.  
The research was supported by GIZ
6
, which assists the Cambodian Ministry of Planning 
in implementing the IDPoor programme. The support consisted of financing the research 
assistant and providing transportation. In return I reported my findings back to GIZ. I selected 
the translator and the setting of the case study independently form GIZ as well as from the 
Ministry of Planning.  
3.1.  Ethnography and its Methodological Assumptions 
The study is based on a social constructivist understanding of social science, thus certain 
epistemological and ontological assumptions underpin the research. Through making these 
assumptions transparent a better understanding of the research design, the explanatory power, 
and the (de)limitations of the study are given.  
From a social constructivist perspective, no ‘single external reality’ exists without a 
perceiving subject. Facts are understood as the outcome of individual interpretation, 
influenced by previous experiences, group belonging and social negotiation processes. Thus, 
phenomena relate to the perceiving subject in various ways, depending on the cultural and 
social context the subject is embedded in (Luckmann, 2008:281). Thereby, the idea about 
universal knowledge and truth – prevalent in positivism – is contested. Rather, truth is 
understood as “an experience in which the knower is a constitutive element of the knowledge 
attained” (Hekman, 1983:208). Knowledge is seen as (a) subjective; (b) situationally and 
culturally variable; as well as (c) ideologically conscious (Marvasti, 2004:5). Thus, applying 
social constructivism allows me to focus on the process by which meanings are created, 
negotiated and sustained and to understand the world of lived experience from the perspective 
of the people under study (Andrews, 2012). This enables me to capture villagers’ diverse and 
conflicting perceptions of the IDPoor programme and understand their actions when 
accommodating the activity.  
As no research regarding the interplay of the IDPoor programme with local social 
structures exists an explorative ethnographic design is chosen. It allows to “enter new worlds” 
(Marvasti, 2004:37) in a flexible and open-ended approach and is “particularly suited for 
                                                          
6
 As mentioned in the introduction, I was an intern at the GIZ Social Health Protection Programme before 
conducting the research. The IDPoor programme and the health programme are carried out by the same agency 
but are not further connected. 
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observing changes [like the introduction of an external development project] in the everyday 
lives of the research subjects” (ibid.:43). The concept of ethnography has no standard well-
defined meaning, as it was re-interpreted and re-contextualised across time and disciplines in 
order to deal with various circumstances the researchers were facing (Hammersley and 
Atkinson, 2007:2). This follows the methodological argument of situated knowledge and 
meaningful praxis outlined above, whereby no ‘standard’ ethnographic approach detached 
from the particular context can be designed. Hence, a distinctive feature of ethnographic 
research is the sensitivity towards the social context. As Tedlock argues, “[e]thnography 
involves an ongoing attempt to place specific encounters, events, and understandings into a 
fuller, more meaningful context” (Tedlock, 2000:455 in Marvasti, 2004:36).  
The fieldwork was conducted in Kaoh Moan village, and was divided into two stages, 
with a break of ten days in between to scrutinise the preliminary material. Overall I stayed 
three weeks in the village. Even though this potentially limits the depth of my insights I argue 
that ethnography is not primarily about the length of stay in the field but rather about applying 
certain methods. According to Marvasti, three dimensions distinguish ethnography from other 
forms of qualitative research. Firstly, emphasis is put on the involvement in and participation 
of the researcher in the topic under study. Secondly, as mentioned, attention is paid to the 
social context in which the empirical material is gathered. Thirdly, the researcher is sensitive 
on how the subjects are represented in the research text (ibid.:35-37). The idea about one 
“true” or “objective” representation is contested; rather a “constructionist awareness of how 
descriptive styles and political agendas shape ethnographic writing” (ibid.:37) is employed. In 
line it is necessary to reflect on the researchers’ personal biography as the individuality and 
distinctiveness of the ethnographer is no longer ‘neutralised’ (as is positivism), but the unique 
characteristics and its influence on the research process is acknowledged (Gottlieb, 2006:59). 
  Hence, this study is “coloured as much by [personal] emotional as by intellectual factors” 
(ibid.:64). Being a white, university-educated female sociologist from what is perceived as the 
'West' shapes my research interest, the decisions regarding the course of research, and my 
interpretations. Throughout studying sociology I was interested in forms and reasons of social 
inequality and stratification. Within the Master's programme of Development Studies I 
extended my focus to evaluation research to be able to assess the impact of development 
activities. These two aspects led to my decision to research the consequences of the IDPoor 
programme for the ‘target population’. Once in the field, I sympathised with the marginalised 
members of the community which is reflected in the decision to investigate the interplay 
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between the project and local power relations. This affected my field notes, which are always 
“a form of representation, that is, a way of reducing just-observed events, persons and places 
to written accounts” (Emerson, Fretz and Shaw, 2001:353). Thereby, they are inevitably 
selective and, given my background, represented in a sociological language.  
3.2. An Ethnographic Single Case Study  
It seems obvious, as Atkinson points out, to choose a setting which is most appropriate 
for studying the research questions (Atkinson, 2007:29). Yet, this is not an easy task for open-
end and explorative research designs. As I was not able to specify the particular nature of the 
setting required beforehand, the selection of the case was driven by pragmatic considerations 
and arising opportunities.  
First of all, the village needed to be reachable within a day's return trip from Phnom 
Penh, a condition of GIZ to provide transportation. Secondly, I was interested in a ‘rather 
small’ village to be able to get a sufficient overview over the village and build a rapport with 
the community within three weeks. I established contact with the Cambodian NGO 
‘Buddhism for Health’ which was related to the IDPoor programme several years ago. A 
member offered me assistance in selecting a village and facilitating the contact with the local 
authorities. I selected Kaoh Moan through discussing four potential cases with him which I 
had chosen from the IDPoor database. Next to the practical considerations a selection 
criterion was a sufficient number of Level 1 and Level 2 poor in the villages while avoiding 
choosing the poorest villages in the province. Kaoh Moan suited me, as it is rather small with 
126 households and has a quite equal distribution of identified Level 1 poverty (13%) and 
Level 2 poverty (16%) households.  
After the selection of a village it was important to bound the case, to be precise about 
which aspects will be addressed in the study and which elements will not form part of the 
research. The way a case is bounded has to be in accordance with the research interest and 
will influence the process and findings of the research (Mills et al, 2010:56-59).  
The study focuses on an entity with relatively clearly defined spatial boundaries – the 
village of Kaoh Moan. Commonsense and theoretical bounding merged when I decided to 
include all people who describe themselves as members of the village community and whose 
families life in the village. As it is important to conceptualise the case in a way that reflects 
my theoretical reasoning (ibid.) I needed to make sure my (framed) case enables me to 
investigate the interplay between the IDPoor programme and the local context. Since 
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especially members of poorer families are forced to work outside the village it is necessary to 
include labour migrants into the study, as they constitute an important part of my research 
interest.  
The temporal boundary of the case is defined as the start of Round 7 of the IDPoor 
programme in 2013 until the distribution of the Equity Cards in February 2015. More 
specifically, the first village meeting in which the villagers were informed about Round 7 
marks the temporal beginning of the case study.  
3.3. Field Methods 
3.3.1. Accessing the Field 
Access is not simply a question of physical absence or presence, as there is a difference 
between “being in a place and having access to the social relations that take place there”. 
(Hammersley and Atkinson, 2007:44) Moreover, it is not something stable once it is gained, 
but a process which develops and can be enriched over time (Feldmann, Berger, Bell, 
2003:vii). Hence, access is understood as a relational process in which building rapport with 
different individuals constitutes an important part. This perspective allows to reflect on the 
influence of the own identity on the ‘access process’ as well as to understand the information 
received in relation to the established rapport (ibid.:x-xi). Getting and developing access is in 
many ways a practical matter which arises from different opportunities and is only partly 
influenceable by the researcher. Within this part I will discuss how the research team gained 
access and established rapport. Moreover, I will reflect on the field roles the research team got 
assigned and how we were able to benefit from this. 
After obtaining permission from national and local authorities the research team (me and 
the research assistant Rithy) entered the village for the first time on February 13, 2015. Even 
though arranged otherwise upon arrival, it was re-decided that we should stay with the village 
chief and his family. Having the field base at the village chief’s house was not desirable, as it 
influences our field roles and the villagers’ perception of us as 'in line' with the local 
authorities. However, during the debate no other opportunity arose and we had to accept the 
offer.  
The research in general and gaining access in particular required acceptance from the 
village chief, as he holds the position of a gatekeeper. Gatekeepers are often the initial point 
of contact with the research setting and they shape the conduct of the study. Staying with the 
village chief meant to a certain extend we were “channelled in line with the existing network 
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of friendship and enmity, territory and equivalent ‘boundaries’” (Hammersley and Atkinson, 
2007:59) of him. Throughout our stay he was concerned with our impression of the village 
and his leadership and offered guiding us through the village. By constantly pointing out that 
we were independent and politely but firmly denying his offer we were able to organise our 
time autonomously.  
During the course of research it became apparent that the villagers, as expected, 
associated us with the village chief. Rithy and me tried to overcome this obstacle of mistrust 
and assigned field role by showing that we were interested in and open to different 
experiences and narratives. Spending time with the families at their homes helped to build 
rapport and gradually changed their perception. Also coming back to the village for the 
second time had a very positive effect on the relation to the villagers. They greeted us like old 
friends and told us what we had missed in the meantime.  
Staying with the village chief also had an unanticipated positive side-effect. As the 
research focus became clearer it became apparent that the relation between the village chief 
and the villagers is of great interest. Through staying with the leader we were able to observe 
villagers approaching him when seeking permissions or bringing forward requests. These 
situations provided valuable insights to understand the social position of the village chief and 
his relation to different villagers.   
Our field roles were determined by various aspects, some assigned, others deliberately 
chosen. The decision about which sort of field role to adapt depends on the purpose of the 
study and the nature of the setting (Hammersley and Atkinson, 2007:86). The concept of 
‘researcher’ was new to the villagers and we got associated with being part of a development 
organisation.
7
 We stressed that we do not belong to any organisation, but this role was 
assigned to us based on the villagers' experiences. The implication was that villagers thought 
the research team will distribute development benefits or can influence the IDPoor 
programme. Moreover, being perceived as a woman had gender implications which did not 
allow me to enter certain social situations. For instance, I was not able to access exclusively 
male groups, especially when they were drinking alcohol. This is considered not appropriate 
for ‘respected women’.  
                                                          
7
 During the second stay we found out that most villagers thought we belong to World Vision, as this 
development organisation is very active in the commune and sometimes members of the organisation visit 
different villages. Luckily, World Vision enjoys the reputation of being independent and fair. 
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3.3.2. Gathering Empirical Material 
Within this study the main tools to gather empirical material were interviews and 
observations. Throughout the first stay in the village explorative interviews and two focus 
group discussions were conducted with various villagers from diverse backgrounds (gender, 
age, registered poor and non-poor). The two focus groups consisted of six and eight 
participants per session, of either registered poor or non-poor members of the community. In 
both focus groups male and female villagers participated, which were between 20 to 55 years 
old. In the beginning we selected across time and people as far as possible to gain a wide 
understanding of the setting and the different stories at the ethnographic side. Through this we 
quickly assembled massive amounts of empirical material on various topics, which helped me 
to gradually expand and deepen my understanding of the community and of issues that could 
not have been demarcated and defined at the start. Over time the research approach became 
narrower and more focused and after finishing the first phase in the field preliminary research 
questions were defined. The second phase of the empirical research consisted of more 
strategic search for empirical material along with deliberate investigation of ‘stories’ that 
seem illustrative to the research interest.  
The main purpose of interviews when applying an ethnographical approach is to “view 
things from the respondents’ perspective, to get to know what she or he knows, thinks and 
wants, and to understand her or his feelings, intentions and meanings” (Merriam, 1994 cited 
in Hasselskog, 2009:52). Hence, the interviews in this study took more the form of a guided 
conversation than a strictly structured inquiry. At the beginning mostly explorative, reflexive 
interviews were conducted to cover a wide range of topics. As the research process moved 
along, the interviews became more structured and focused on specific issues to investigate, 
verify, invalidate or supplement previous findings. The villagers were mostly interviewed in 
their homes, in a natural and relaxing setting. Informed consent was obtained before every 
interview. The interviews and the focus group discussions usually turned into collective 
encounters as family members or neighbours got involved as they pleased. This influenced the 
context and thereby the accounts given by the interviewees. Even though individual 
interviews are easier to steer and analyse it would have been odd to stop other villagers from 
joining, as the interviews in general were conducted ‘in public’. During these spontaneous and 
flexible gatherings various opinions were expressed, discussions emerged and we were able to 
observe group interactions. Nevertheless, topics regarding very personal experiences required 
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privacy. Therefore, during the second phase, appointments were made and privacy was 
arranged for a number of interviews. This was with individuals who had been identified as 
offering illustrative cases to investigate relevant analytical aspects like conflicts with the 
village leadership or social exclusion. For these interviews it was very important that a 
relation of respects and trust had been established.  
As a “strategic search for empirical material [...] is essential to a reflexive approach” 
(Hammersley and Atkinson, 2007:104) it is important to reflect and control whom to 
interview. Otherwise the empirical material could be misleading or selective in regard to 
important aspects (ibid.). The selection of the interviews was informed by the progress for the 
research. As the research became more focused a purposeful snowball sampling was applied. 
Respondents helped to identify further suitable respondents with similar or different 
experiences and follow-up interviews were conducted with villagers who offered especially 
valuable insights. Through this, rapport was continuously enriched, which allowed to have 
more open and trustful conversations.  
Given the sensitive topic of this study I cannot reveal too many details about the 
interviewees to ensure anonymity, yet I will shortly illustrate some general characteristics of 
this group of people. Overall, 17 interviews were conducted, including the village chief and 
the five members of the Village Representative Group. The interviews were mainly conducted 
during the second time in the field, as the research focus was clearer by then. Out of these 17 
interviews, ten participants were female. Mostly members of the community considered as 
poor were interviewed, yet only seven interviewees were identified as poor through the 
IDPoor programme. The interviewees were from different ages groups. The youngest 
participant was 23 years old, while the exact age of the oldest participants in unknown, but he 
estimated to be around 60 years old. Some interviewees seemed to obtain a rather 
marginalised position within the community, which seemed to be not only related to their 
economical situation. As the interviews were taped several informal talks were required 
beforehand to obtain trust of these villagers in order to conduct the interviews.   
Observations constitute the second main tool for gathering empirical material in this 
study. This approach is suitable for investigating aspects people are reluctant to talk about. 
For example it is crucial to “not only ask who holds power, but also to watch who wields 
different sorts of power on different occasions” (Hasselskog, 2009:56). During our time in the 
village we were able to observe how different issues arose and were dealt with between 
individuals and the community. Due to the language barrier full participation was not 
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possible, thus my position can better be described as “observer as participant”. (Gold 1958 
cited in Hammersley and Atkinson, 2007:83) However, through sharing meals, playing with 
the children and in general ‘hanging out’ with the families I was able to “to learn about [...] 
feelings, rules, and norms in context rather than asking about them” (O’Reilly, 2009:160). It 
allows including the “entire context of an event [...] rather than relying on the interpretation 
[and] recollection [...] of events that tend to go with reporting” (ibid.). I was able to map 
kinship to a certain extent, which helped understanding the social structures. I usually wrote 
extensive field notes during the mid-day break when everyone was fleeing from the heat and 
after dark. The nature of the field notes changed from a wide scope to a selective and more 
detailed description of relevant aspects.  
3.4. (De)Limitations and Trustworthiness  
Several boundaries of the research design exist, which will be addressed in this chapter. 
In relation to this, aspects ensuring a high quality of the study, through assuring 
trustworthiness, and the influence of my own background on the study will be discussed. 
It should be clear by now that, no abstraction or generalisation of ethnographic results is 
possible. They reveal their meaning only against the backdrop of the context in which the 
empirical material was gathered – in this case Kaoh Moan. Moreover, cross-cultural, cross-
language research poses some margins to the explanatory power. Language is a central aspect 
of all qualitative research. It is inseparable from culture and not simply “a tool we use to 
communicate ideas [...]; it is implicated in discursive practices that actively construct our 
sociocultural world through systems of representation and assigned meanings” (Wong and 
Poon, 2010:152). Given that language is a cultural construct not all aspects could be translated 
from Khmer to English, as no conceptual and cultural equivalent exists. However, the local 
research assistant Rithy had experiences in conducting and translating qualitative interviews 
and helped to overcome some of these limitations. Rithy had a Bachelor of Law degree and 
was working for a human rights NGO in Phnom Penh. I chose him because he grew up in 
rural Cambodia, which would make it easier for him to understand and navigate in the setting. 
As ethnography was new to him, we met multiple times prior entering the field to clarify the 
research approach. Moreover, we discussed the value of full and open disclosure of accounts 
given by the villagers. These meetings helped to establish a trustful and open relationship I 
consider necessary when conducting an ethnographic study with a local research assistant.   
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Apart from working with a research assistant who served as a ‘cultural guide’, the quality 
of the study was assured through dependability (consistency of the inquiry process), method 
triangulation and cross-checking. I assure dependability of my results, based on a consistent, 
traceable and logic inquiry of my empirical material. In order to assure credibility I rely on 
method triangulation. Hence, the use of multiple instruments to gather my material increased 
the credibility of my findings (Schwandt, 2007:299-301). I gathered material from three 
distinctive sources: (a) semi-structured and open-ended interviews; (b) focus group 
discussions; (c) participant observations and informal talks. Moreover, the iterative process of 
follow-up interviews and day-to-day engagement with different members of the community 
allowed cross-checking accounts brought up by the villagers as well as my own sense-making 
and conclusions (Hasselskog, 2009:56).  
3.5. Ethical Concerns  
As every social research, the study poses various ethical questions which need to be 
discussed. Firstly, all research contains dimensions of power in multiple relations. In this case 
between the researcher and the research assistant, the research team and the researched, the 
local authorities and the villagers, the ‘rich’ and ‘poor’ in the village, etc. The case under 
study focuses on ‘poor people’, a group generally considered as holding a vulnerable social 
position. According to Desai and Potter (2006), in regards to power relations, the researcher 
needs to be context-sensitive and honest about the research interest as well as the possible 
consequences of the study (Potter and Desai, 2006:28). This implies, that the researcher is 
aware of any social, political or legal complication that might emerge from participating, and 
should safeguard against these. Rithy and I discussed the implications of the study for the 
participants along the course of research, however, given our outsider status not all 
implications were known to us. We ensured confidentiality and gradually established a 
rapport based on trust and respect. Through visiting various families we avoided to single out 
certain community members, which might have lead to negative consequences for them. 
Nevertheless, the villagers did also possess a certain degree of power over the course of 
research, the research setting and about what they reveal during interviews and informal talks 
(Lindsjö, 2013:100-101). 
Moreover, the research focuses on aspects of local power relations and experiences of 
social exclusion, which constitute very sensitive topics. Rithy served as a guide in regards to 
cultural sensitivity, as “the researcher should be sensitive towards the rights, beliefs and 
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cultural context of the researcher” (Desai and Potter, 2006:63). Additionally, when 
recognising signs of distress for the informants, we guided the conversation to another topic.  
A third aspect concerns the demand of villagers for compensation when participating – a 
concept they know from development agencies conducting interviews or workshops with 
them. We emphasised participation is voluntary and not financially compensated. The 
distinction between “formal interviews” and “informal talks” was fluent throughout our stay. 
Hence, if we had paid for formal interviews, the question of paying the villagers for generally 
spending time with us would have been posed sooner or later, which would have probably 
ruined the research. Even though no monetary compensation was given, I believe the research 
can still be beneficial for the villagers, as the findings are discussed with GIZ and can 
contribute to improving the IDPoor programme. 
3.6. Model of Analysis  
Once gathered, the analysis of the empirical material depends on the aims of the study, the 
underlying epistemological assumptions and the research questions (Atkinson, 2015:3).  Yet, 
the analysis cannot be considered a distinct stage in an ethnographic study (Atkinson, 
2007:158). In this research, the sense-making of the material started as soon as we entered 
Kaoh Moan and continued through the whole course of the research. Throughout the inquiry 
the research problem was constantly (re-)formulated and (re-)focused. This occurred rather 
‘naturally’ by taking up and reflecting on talks and observations and gradual broadening of 
my understanding of the social structures in the community. The final research questions 
where clarified and delimited through close reading and coding of the material and constant 
discussion with theories and former studies, which helped me to discover and define what my 
research is about. 
The empirical material was analysed through applying a thematic analysis. As a broad and 
flexible technique, the approach can be adequately tailored for the purpose of scrutinising my 
diverse material. This technique allows for organising and synthesising large amounts of 
empirical material, and helps to negotiate the interplay between the raw material, codes or 
themes and the overarching conceptual framework (Guest and McLellan, 2003:3). 
Generally, it can be defined as a “method for identifying, analysing and reporting patterns 
(themes) within empirical material” (Braun and Clarke, 2006:80). A theme captures 
something interesting and important about the material in relation to the research questions 
and usually represents a “patterned response or meaning” in the material. Albeit, a repetition 
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of certain codes can be a strong indication of a theme, quantity in itself does not pose a 
sufficient condition of a theme (ibid.:82). Emphasis was put on identifying latent themes to 
“examine the underlying ideas, assumptions and conceptualisations [...] that are theorised as 
shaping or informing the semantic content of the empirical material” (ibid.:84). Themes were 
identified by merging an inductive with a theoretical approach (ibid.:83). Even though the 
themes are strongly connected to the material itself the coding was driven by my analytical 
interest. However, in respect to the explorative and actor-oriented nature of this study it is 
important not to force the analysis of the material into pre-existing theoretical concepts and 
ideas (Atkinson, 2007:163).  
 
4. Theoretical Framework 
Within this chapter the theoretical framework underpinning this thesis is presented. The 
theory was developed in close dialogue with the findings and other ethnographic studies. The 
findings denote the centralisation of power as well as various respond strategies developed by 
the villagers. This pinpoints the need to establish a theoretical framework which allows 
analysing how and why agents with different social positions exercise power and how social 
structures influence the actions agents pursue.  
Most of the studies discussed in the literature review apply a Foucauldian framework in 
order to study power. Yet, given the findings, a post-structuralist approach to power is 
contested. The conceptualisation of power as something which can be accumulated or 
centralised is opposed by the Foucauldian understanding of power as flux and fluid (Sadan, 
1997:57-59). Moreover, the findings clearly indicate an actor-centred analysis whereas 
Foucault’s work has been criticised for dismissing the agent (ibid.:59). In sum, 
conceptualising power in different ways allows scrutinising different dynamics and social 
processes relevant for understanding the ways in which development projects become shaped 
and adapted by the local context they encounter. This study does not aim for researching all 
possible aspects of such a broad concept. Rather, based on my material and my research 
interest, one particular framework was developed and applied. 
In order to analyse my material adequately and to be able to discuss conflicting findings, 
the theoretical framework combines (complementary) concepts from Long (2001), Lukes 
(2005), Giddens (1984) and Scott (1990). The chapter begins by defining development 
programmes as social interventions which encounter life-worlds at “interfaces”. These 
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interventions become shaped and adopted by existing social structures. In order to analyse 
how agents understand and accommodate the IDPoor intervention power is conceptualised as 
transformative capacity influenced by actors’ ability to access and mobilise structural rules 
and resources. According to Lukes’ concept of three dimensions of power, this transformative 
capacity is exercised in a visible, a hidden and an invisible sphere. Through combining Lukes’ 
three dimensions of power and Giddens’ concept of duality of structure, focus is put on who 
does and who does not participate in decision-making processes and how actions are 
influenced by structures of domination. In order to represent complex and conflicting social 
realities, Lukes’s third dimension – the internalisation of domination – will be contrasted by 
Scotts’s concept on tactical submission. Thereby, not only willing compliance through 
internalised social norms and accepted domination, but also strategic subordination and 
hidden resistance can be analysed.  
4.1. Social Interventions Encounter Life-Worlds at Interfaces  
Within this research development programmes are regarded as external intervention into 
a local setting. A number of scholars and practitioners with diverse backgrounds and 
ideologies have regarded development assistance as interventions (e.g. Easterly 2006, Escobar 
1995, Hasselskog 2009, Li 2007, Olivier de Sardan 2005). Considering development projects 
as external interventions allows to see them as “on-going socially-constructed, negotiated, 
experiential and meaning-creating process[es]” (Long, 2001:25), instead of simple executions 
of specific plans with expected outcomes. Thereby, emergent forms of interactions, practical 
strategies, types of discourse and cultural categories (ibid.:26) come to the centre of attention 
and can be investigated in this study.  
According to Norman Long, the encounter between an external intervention and an 
already existing context takes place at an ‘interface’. Interfaces are “arenas in which 
interactions become oriented around problems of bridging, accommodating, segregating or 
contesting social, evaluative and cognitive standpoints” (Long, 2001:65). Although the term 
‘interface’ conveys the image of a kind of face-to-face situations, a social interface is much 
more complex in nature and consist of “many different interests, relationships and modes of 
rationality and power” (ibid.:66). At implementation level, manifestations of a development 
intervention encounter and interact with the life-worlds of individuals and are mediated by 
them. Life-worlds describe the lived-in and taken for granted worlds, defined by the actors, 
not by the observers (Arce and Long, 1992:212). The ‘external factors’ become internalised 
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and form a part of the resources and constrains of the social strategies people develop. 
Thereby, development interventions can have various meanings for different interest groups 
or individuals and are often modified or even completely transformed through the interplay. 
Hence, through diverse interactions between prevailing and newly introduced features, 
development interventions become shaped and accommodated in socio-economic structures, 
in people's life-worlds and in the overall local dynamics (Hasselskog 2009:112, Long and 
Long 1992:147-148, Villarreal 1994). The focus of this work is to understand and analyse the 
process of shaping and accommodating the IDPoor intervention by the existing local power 
relations. 
4.2.  Defining and Conceptualising Power  
Power can be seen as one of the most contested concepts in sociology and no single 
definition exists. Rather it represents a cluster of concepts, where different perspectives as 
well as normative stances influence its theorisation (Haugaard and Clegg, 2009:1-4). Within 
this study power is conceptualised according to Giddens and Lukes as ‘transformative 
capacity’ and ‘power over’. This constitutes one way of framing the concept and many others 
– equally valuable ones – exist. Yet, given the research questions and the empirical material at 
hand, this conceptualisation seems most adequate. Not only does it allow to analytically 
understand how and why the villagers comply with the village chief. Also, it enables to focus 
on how the unequal social structures limit and enable possibilities to manoeuvre within the 
given space. Thus, villagers are not just framed as ‘powerless’, but rather their struggles, 
negations and compromises within their special circumstances can be scrutinised. 
Both – Lukes and Giddens – perceive power mainly as ‘power over something’ and stress 
the importance of human agency in order to study the concept. Moreover, both authors tried to 
overcome the structure-agency dilemma. Whereas Lukes developed a ‘dialectic’ approach 
(Lukes, 2005:11), Giddens emphasised the ‘dualism’ of structure and agency (Giddens, 
1984:25). These similarities allow for a useful combination of the two approaches. They differ 
in their understanding of the relation between power and personal interests. Whereas Giddens 
argues power is not intrinsically linked to the achievement of interests (Giddens, 1984:27), 
Lukes argues that powerful actors or groups exercise power to pursue their interests (Lukes, 
2005:12). My empirical material points to Lukes’ perception, and even though other reasons 
for exercising power exists, they do not form part of this study. 
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4.2.1. Defining Power 
In order to apply power as a concept to an empirically grounded study, a clear delineation 
is necessary. In this chapter I develop a definition of power adequate for this work and 
highlight its relation to social structure and human agency. I consider the stance taken on 
these fundamental sociological concepts important for the theorisation of power, as different 
perceptions of power often arise from different understandings of structure and agency. 
On the most fundamental level, power refers to “A having some affect on B”, hence 
“power involves the production of causal effects” (Scott, 2001:i). A generic definition then 
refers to the “capacity to bring about change” (ibid.), which can be seen as an integral aspect 
of all human actions. In this sense throughout this study power is defined according to 
Giddens as the “transformative capacities of human action” (Giddens 1976:110 cited in 
Hausgaard, 1992:91). In order words, as the “ability to make a difference in the world” (ibid.). 
This is an essential prerequisite for agency, thus all actors possess some degree of power and 
can develop response strategies to the course of everyday life.  
Individuals are able to do this because they possess ‘knowledgeability’, which means 
“actors not only monitor continuously the flow of their activities and expect others to do the 
same for their own; they also routinely monitor aspects, social and physical, of the context in 
which they move” (Giddens 1984:5). This knowledge about social structures is ‘stored’ in 
“memory traces” (ibid.:17) of actors and is recallable. Thereby, actions become intentional, 
since actors can usually explain why they decided to engage in certain actions (Hausgaard, 
1992:78).  
Structures are defined as systems of generative rules and resources. An actor exercises 
power through using these structural resources and rules, and by drawing on them he/she 
reproduces them as aspects of the social order (McPhee, 2004:130). Rules are understood as 
“taken for granted processes or conventions” (Giddens, 1979:100). Resources are either 
‘allocative resources’, as command over objects, or ‘authorative resources’, as command over 
persons. Giddens speaks of ‘structures as domination’ when an unequal distribution of 
resources characterises the social structures. Hence, through the mobilisation of resources 
these structures of domination, which determine an actors’ ability to influence the world, are 
reproduced. The reproduction of structures is not perceived as a mechanical outcome, but 
“rather [...] as an active constituting process, accomplished by, and consisting in, the doing of 
 Stefanie Licht 
Masters of Science in Development Studies 
Graduate School & Department of Sociology 
 
25 
 
active subjects” (Giddens, 1977:121). Thereby, power is not itself a resource but rather 
exercised through structures of domination (ibid.).  
To understand this perception of power it has to be grounded in Giddens’ overall social 
theory of Structuration. “Structuration theory attempts to [...] [show] how ‘social structures 
are both constituted by human agency, and yet at the same time are the very medium of this 
constitution’ (ibid.). This is what Giddens means by ‘duality of structure’, whereby he tries to 
overcome the structure-agency dilemma through offering a “reciprocal relationship where 
neither structure nor action can exist independently” (Giddens 1984:25). Social structure and 
human agency can be understood as different sides of the same coin, because “[s]ocial 
structures are represented in the choices agents make during social practice, while at the same 
time, agents shape and reshape social structures” (Hardcastel et al 2005:224). ). Thereby, 
social structures are enabling and constraining for human actions simultaneously. This implies 
that the structural characteristics of social systems are the medium and the outcome of the 
social actions they recursively organise (Giddens, 1984:25). 
4.2.2. Three Dimensions of Power  
Power – perceived as a capacity to bring about change through drawing on rules and 
resources – is conceptualised by Lukes as three-dimensional: with a public, a hidden, and an 
invisible dimension. His basic argument emphasises that even though every actor possess 
some degree of power, it is important to not just understand who participates in decision-
making processes and draws on rules and resources, but also who does not participate.  
The first dimension describes visible and definable aspects of power, like formal rules, 
authorities, institutions and procedures of decision-making realised through elections, political 
parties, laws, budgets, etc. Here the mechanism through which power functions is relatively 
straightforward, like actors drawing on their resources and advantageous structural positions 
to obtain an advantage when bargaining on key issues (Lukes, 2005:9). This dimension is 
grounded in a rather positivist perception of power. Yet, as obscure and less visible social and 
cultural practice shape who takes part in these observable decision-making processes – hence 
who sits at the table and whose issues get addressed –hidden and invisible dimensions of 
power also have to be taken into consideration.  
Therefore, in addition to the first dimension, powerful actors can mobilise or influence 
“rules of the game” to work in their favour. This second dimension of power is less obvious, 
thus called hidden dimension. Hereby, decision-making might be prevented through the threat 
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or use of force and sanctions or the mobilisation of biases, which means the reinforcement of 
“values, beliefs, ceremonies and institutional procedures which present a very particular and 
limited definition of problems” (Sadan, 2002:43). The dynamics in the second dimension can 
lead to the exclusion and devaluation of the concerns and representation of less powerful 
groups (Lukes, 2005:11). This dimension refers to the power of framing or representing a 
problem in a certain way. Even though I consider the phrase ‘mobilisation of biases’ 
inadequate, as it indicates a non-biased, power-free way of defining problems exist, the 
overall idea that powerful groups can influence the agenda setting is important to understand 
how domination works. 
The third dimension operates in a way which renders competing interests or problems 
invisible. This means issues are not only kept from the decision-making table, as is the second 
dimension, but overall from the consciousness of the different players involved (ibid.: 24). 
Thereby, through processes of domination the relatively powerless internalise and accept 
certain values and social norms as well as perceptions of themselves and their conditions. So, 
those subjected to power acquire beliefs and form desires that work against their ‘real 
interests’, which results in their consenting or adapting to being dominated. The unawareness 
of the real interests occurs through a ‘false consciousness’ which then leads to the willing 
compliance of the subordinated to the domination (ibid.:13).  
Especially the third dimension raises a set of complex questions and critiques which need 
to be addressed in order to develop a thorough framework. Firstly, the idea of ‘false 
consciousness’ implicitly presupposes the existence of ‘true consciousness’. This is criticised 
as elitist and over-simplifies the ways in which social order is maintained and stabilised 
(Haugaard, 2011:165). To overcome Lukes’s shortcomings in this study, I will refer to 
Giddens’s division of social knowledge into practical and discursive consciousness, which is 
characterised through awareness and unawareness, whereby the notion of falsity is dropped. 
Practical consciousness is “what actors know tacitly about the conditions of their own action 
but cannot articulate” (Bryant and Jary, 1991:8, emphasis added). It enables actors to “go on” 
in social life (Haugaard, 2003:100), but they are unaware of it. Discursive consciousness 
“comprises knowledge which we can put in words” (ibid., emphasis added), or as Giddens 
describes it: “what actors are able to say about the condition of their own action” (Giddens, 
1984:5). This separation into two types of social knowledge helps to understand how systems 
– also the ones characterised by unequal power relations – are maintained in a stable way. If 
an action has never been critically evaluated, in the sense of forming part of the discursive 
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consciousness of the actor, then it will be reproduced similarly to a reflex. This happens even 
when the structures which are reproduced disadvantage the actor. Through this separation of 
types of social knowledge the false-true dilemma can be replaced through the idea of 
unawareness. Yet, this unawareness can change – through “consciousness raising” (Haugaard, 
2003:101). This happens, for example, through “making actors aware of aspects of their 
practical consciousness knowledge which previously they never confronted in a discursive 
way” (ibid.). Thus, once knowledge of structural reproduction becomes discursive, the actor 
may reject it. To conclude, the normative true-false dichotomy of consciousness can be 
replaced through the idea of awareness/unawareness. Haugaard gives an illustrative example 
when he explains how reading Foucault’s description of the Panopticon did not reveal truth to 
him through deconstructing falsity, but rather he came to realise patterns of conduct which he 
was not aware of – which he had internalised (Haugaard, 2003:102). 
The second analytical problem Lukes’s third dimension poses is: “[w]ho is to say who is 
dominated and on what basis?” (Lukes, 2005:111). This question is related to the unresolved 
debate on how to distinguish between domination and socialisation. When does one comply to 
something because he/she is dominated and when does one comply because he/she has been 
socialised that way? Lukes and many other scholars’ elaboration on theories of power lack to 
give a conclusive answer to this question and the theoretical debate between socialisation and 
domination cannot be adequately addressed here. As theoretical development is not core of 
this study I operationalise domination in a way useful to analytically understand my empirical 
material and leave the theoretical debate as a front line for other academics. Domination will 
be defined as a particular type of power relation, which is hierarchical and difficult to reverse. 
In these relations, the subordinate agent has little room for manoeuvres and sparse access to 
structural rules and resources to exercise power. Domination has been internalised when 
agents do not recognise it anymore, as they emphasise the 'naturalness' of this hierarchy.  
4.2.3. Subordination as Tactical Positioning 
Even though Lukes offers an applicable theory to understand willing compliance, in order 
to be able to analyse conflicting aspects of my empirical material another causal explanation 
for submission will be integrated into the framework. 
A number of studies indicate that agents can be aware of their domination, but either 
comply willingly or are rather fatalistic due to on-going experiences of defeat (e.g. Gaventa, 
1980; Scott, 1987; Villarreal, 1994). As my empirical material indicates similar aspects I will 
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integrate Scott’s conceptualisation of compliance as tactical decision of agents as a second 
way of explaining subordination to structures of domination. Instead of claiming agents 
internalised suppressing norms and are unaware of this, he argues agents do resist, even 
though less visibly. He distinguishes between ‘hidden’ and ‘public transcripts’, with the 
former displaying “social space in which offstage dissent to the official transcript of power 
relations might be voiced” (Scott, 1990:xiii). By contrast, the public transcripts display 
evidence for the dominant power relations. Hence, a study based solely on these public 
accounts “is likely to conclude that subordinated groups endorse the terms of their 
subordination and a willing, even enthusiastic, partners in that subordination” (ibid.:4). 
Thereby, Scott differentiates between a front-stage and back-stage behaviour which is driven 
by the objectives to (a) avoid any explicit display of insubordination, and (b) practical interest 
in resistance to minimise the extractions, labour and humiliations (ibid.:86). This leads to a 
form of resistance “that avoids an open confrontation with the structures of authority being 
resisted [...] [and] performance of subordination will [...] be shaped to appeal to the 
expectations of the powerful” (ibid.). Aiming to research hidden transcripts calls for an 
ethnographic approach, as the objective is to engage in the field in order to investigate 
people’s back-stage behaviour. 
4.3.  Summary – Towards a Working Framework for Analysing Power 
Structures 
To summarise, the theoretical framework underpinning this study defines development 
programmes as social interventions into a pre-existing social order. The intervention 
encounters the social setting at interfaces, where the newly introduced features become 
bridged, accommodated, contested and integrated into the existing order. This systematic 
thinking allows to analyse how through diverse interactions between prevailing and newly 
introduced features, development interventions become shaped by local dynamics. The local 
dynamics are characterised by a reciprocal relationship between human agency and social 
structures, whereby structures limit and enable agency.  
In order to analyse the dynamics which occur in Kaoh Moan a conceptualisation of power 
is necessary which scrutinises why and how subordination to domination occurs and how this 
reproduces structural power inequalities. Therefore, power is defined as a capacity to bring 
about change, which is exercised by mobilising structural resources and rules. If the social 
structures are characterised by unequal accessibility for different actors they take the form of 
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‘structures as domination’. These structures of domination determine and actors ability to 
influence the world. 
This capacity to influence the world will be analysed along three dimensions of power, 
categorised as a formal and observable exercise of power (visible), power that is exercised 
from behind the scenes to influence the agenda-setting (hidden), and as hegemonic norms and 
beliefs that secure consent to domination (visible). In order to avoid Lukes's impasse on false 
consciousness it is replaced by Giddens’s perception of awareness derived from 
differentiating practical and discursive consciousness. To be able to represent and analyse 
conflicting narratives from my empirical material Scott’s concept of subordination as tactical 
positioning is integrated as a complementary concept to the internalised domination. 
 
5. Empirical Findings 
Within the thesis the findings and the analysis of the findings are represented in separate 
chapters. The following section illustrates the findings, based on my empirical material 
gathered during my fieldwork in Kaoh Moan in February and March 2015. The separation can 
be considered an unusual practice in ethnography, as the division into findings and analysis 
stems from a positivist thinking according to which the findings are the objective 
representation of facts. Yet this is not what I want to indicate through this structure. Rather, 
already portraying the findings constitutes some kind of analysis, as deciding which parts to 
represent and how to structure them is a form of making sense of the material. Thereby, the 
notion of objectification or representation of facts is contested. However, the division into 
findings and analysis helped me to better understand what is going on in my material and to 
present it in a more structured way, whereby also conformability can be enhanced. Therefore, 
I discuss the two parts separately, even though they both compose parts of the analysis.  
Within this chapter four identified themes are displayed, which cover the villagers’ 
perceptions of: (a) IDpoor intervention
8
; (b) the management of development interventions in 
Kaoh Moan; and (c) local leadership. The fourth theme illustrates (d) villagers’ strategies to 
keep a good relation with the leader. The four overarching themes that could be identified 
overlap and mutually affect each other, therefore clear-cut delineation was difficult and some 
overarching aspects will be repeated in different chapters. Overall, these findings have to be 
                                                          
8
 In accordance with the theoretical framework of this study the IDpoor programme will be regarded as external 
intervention. Chapter 5 discusses this. 
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understood as depicting the perspective of the group of people under study, yet my own 
perspective and limitations influenced the representation of the community. 
The findings illuminate the overall research question: How does the Kaoh Moan 
community adapt the ‘Identification of Poor Households’ intervention to its pre-existing 
social structures? and form the basis of later analytical discussions. 
5.1. The IDPoor Programme – A New Link in a Long Chain of Development 
Activities 
The first theme is divided into two sub-themes depicting the perceptions of the villagers 
on the overall programme, and the perception of the VRG members in relation to their role 
within the programme. Given the social constructivist assumption that distinct social positions 
within a community influence individual perceptions, I consider it necessary to display these 
different stances.  
5.1.1. The IDPoor Programme as Putting Resources on Display  
This sub-theme illustrates villagers’ perception of the IDPoor intervention, which has to 
be understood in relation to the long history of development programmes implemented in 
Kaoh Moan. Overall, the community is aware that development interventions put different 
resources on display and the Equity Card is perceived as such a potential personal benefit.  
From the moment we entered Kaoh Moan people approached us to ask for which 
development organisation we work and what kind of benefits we distribute. The villagers 
were wearing T-shirts from different development agencies, from global non-governmental 
organisations like World Vision and the Red Cross to governmental agencies like DFID and 
USAID and bodies of the United Nations. According to the community members, apart from 
the IDPoor programme, there exist(ed) programmes in regard to education, agriculture and 
water management, safe delivery and new-born care, vaccination and health insurance, 
sanitation and hygiene as well as three different micro-credit operators and a sponsorship 
programme for children. Two public ponds were, through financial support from a national 
development organisation, collectively built and are supervised by a pond commission. A 
‘gender group’ and a ‘village development group’ existed, however both groups seemed to be 
rather inactive. Additionally, at least three village health workers and a village veterinarian 
have been trained by development agencies and were more or less active.  
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Thus, the community in Kaoh Moan was quite experienced with different development 
interventions. The different projects were debated within the community, some are judged 
useful, others damned as being merely sales promotions, a bunch of pointless meetings or 
leading to indebtedness. It was obvious that Kaoh Moan had a long history of different 
development activities and that villagers were familiar with a variety of projects.  
Villagers perceived development interventions as offering different personal benefits they 
can capitalise on. They showed us pumps and toilets built in their yard by UNICEF, 
scholarships provided by World Vision and donations of rice and fertilizer from the ruling 
Cambodian People’s Party. Apart from material assets, engaging in a development 
programme sometimes comes with financial compensation for participating in meetings or 
becoming an interviewer.  
Frequently, after clarifying that we research the IDPoor programme, villagers approached 
us to claim their family should get an Equity Card. A woman living in a small shed in the east 
of the village told us:  
We want to get a poor card [Equity Card] as well, because when I went to the 
hospital, I spend much money. I borrowed 1 Million riel
9
 from a development 
organisation to give birth to my baby, and until now we are still in debt... And 
people who have such a card, when they give birth, the do not spend money... 
[laugh] I want to have the card as well. 
            (Interview at her house, 18.02.2015) 
The understanding of the Equity Card as a useful resource was widespread and nearly all 
villagers perceived being registered as poor as something advantageous. The village chief 
goes as far as to claim: “Now that everyone knows about the programme everybody wants to 
have the poor card [Equity Card]. Even the rich want to be poor. [laugh]” (Informal talk, 
16.02.2015). Another indication that villagers want to take advantage of the Equity Card are 
the accounts of the VRG members and the village chief, that some households were hiding 
information or property in order to appear poorer. Hence, the community members are aware 
that being registered as poor entails certain benefits for them and their families.  
To summarise, the meaning the community ascribes to the IDPoor intervention has to be 
understood in relation to the extensive amount of development activities implemented in 
Kaoh Moan. All families had been in contact with various development programmes and are 
aware that personal benefits can arise from engaging in interventions. The IDPoor programme 
                                                          
9
 This equates to around 124 Euros. 
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just seemed to be the latest link of a long chain of development interventions which put 
resources on display. The villagers perceive the IDPoor intervention as useful, as it offers 
access to free public health services. Hence, the Equity Card is perceived as beneficial 
resource. Overall, the fieldwork indicates that the villagers are experienced in dealing with 
different development programmes. Against the backdrop of this the Equity Card is perceived 
as a new resource the villagers would like to capitalise on.  
5.1.2. The VRG Members as Assistants to the Leader  
This chapter displays the perceptions of the VRG members in regard to their tasks and the 
village chief’s role as head of the VRG. The findings reveal the members’ passive 
understanding of their responsibilities and the acceptance of an ancillary position in relation to 
the village chief.  
It was a frustrating piecemeal process to identify the members of the VRG. It turned out 
they themselves do not know who forms part of their group. With help from the village chief 
and the deputy we were able to identify the current members. The group consists of four men 
and one woman. Three of the five members are relatives of the village chief, while one man is 
the son of the deputy village chief. The village chief serves as the head of the group. 
One key aspect of the VRG is its legitimisation and independence based on its public 
election. However, accounts differ on how the VRG was established. While two members 
claimed they got elected, two stated they got selected by the village chief, and one member 
cannot remember the process. The villagers cannot recall an election of the VRG either, yet 
many stated they do not participate in all meetings the village chief schedules.  
A main task of the VRG is to jointly decide which households shall be interviewed based 
on their local knowledge of the community. Again, accounts of the members differ on how 
this was accomplished. While some claim they jointly decided whom to interview, the others 
declare they got assigned certain households by the village chief. The village chief explains 
that he, together with the Commune Council, decides which households shall be interviewed. 
In spite of the many uncertainties, all members of the VRG perceive their tasks within a 
rather narrow scope. A male member of the VRG, states:  
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My responsibility… I went to the villagers’ household and asked them about their 
properties [...] I interviewed them, and I note it down in the questionnaire, and 
then I total the score. [...] Afterwards we give the questionnaire to the village 
chief, then we finished our job.  
     (Interview at her house, 06.03.2015) 
The female members’ account draws a similar picture:  
The village chief gave us the name of the households to be interviewed and told us 
to share the household. [...] I did not do much work because I went directly to 
interview the villagers at their home, and I could interview around 2 or 3 
households per day. That is all.      
                (Interview at her house, 08.03.2015) 
So, neither the VRG decides which households shall be interviewed, nor do they come 
together afterwards to jointly discuss if special circumstances would justify a re-
categorisation. When talking about categorising the households according to the score the son 
of the deputy chief claims:  
I don’t know. I never saw it [draft list of poor households]. I don’t know. We only 
interviewed the villagers and gave it [questionnaires] to the village chief. And 
then I don’t know what the upper level did. This was not my work. 
             (Interview at his house, 06.03.2015) 
Not knowing or not being responsible was constantly expressed by all VRG members, 
which indicates their narrow understanding of their scope of work and the subordination of 
their position as VRG member to the local leaders. When asking what they do, if villagers 
approach them to complain about the categorisation or make suggestions all accounted to 
refer them to the village chief, as they are not responsible for the programme. 
This is manifested by the village chief’s position as coordinator of the group. He 
explains:  
I do not have any role in doing the IDPoor card, but the document 
[implementation manual] states that the village chief is the coordinator of the 
Village Representative Group. [...] That is how I became head of the group. 
     (Interview at his house, 09.03.2015)  
Yet, throughout the conversation he later adds tasks like: selecting which households will 
be interviewed, supervising the VRG members, checking the answers given by the families 
and calculating the scores, assigning a preliminary poverty category, considering special 
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circumstances, organising the village consultation meeting and distributing the Equity Cards. 
Although the implementation manual does not state that the village chief automatically serves 
as head of the VRG, none of the group members or villagers questions this. Instead, it seemed 
rather ‘natural’ that the village chief takes up this position. The son of the village chief (also 
member of the VRG) reasons why the village leader has such an influential role in the 
programme:  
After the interviews we took the questionnaire back so the village chief can check 
whether the interviewers are right or wrong. (…) Sometimes some interviewers 
might be confused or the villagers were hiding something, so they may give 
wrong information. When the village chief checks and sees that it is incorrect, he 
changes it because he knows.  
     (Interview at his house, 04.03.2015) 
Hence, the village chief’s knowledge about the individual situation of the households 
justifies his influence. This perception is shared by all VRG members and relates to the 
overall understanding of local leadership in the village, a theme which is explored in-depth in 
the next chapter.  
To summarise, it is not clear how the VRG was established, yet strong indication exists 
that the leader selected the members. They perceive themselves neither as a group nor as 
responsible for any task apart from executing the interviews. All members see the village 
chief as responsible for the overall intervention and perceive their role as inferior to his. 
Therefore, they comply with his decisions. 
5.2. The Management of Interventions – The Leader Decides 
The second theme represents the communities’ perceptions of the influence of the village 
chief over development interventions in Kaoh Moan. This serves as an example to illuminate 
his influential position within the village. In regard to the research interest, an emphasis is put 
on his control over the IDPoor programme. Conflicting opinions in regard to the village 
chiefs’ influence over interventions exist in the community, which will be displayed within 
this chapter. 
Not just the VRG, but also the villagers perceive the process of identifying poor 
households as being influenced by the village chief. A middle-aged woman states during the 
focus group discussion: “The village chief selected who will get the [Equity] card, we did not 
grab it from each other. The village chief appointed the households. He selected us because 
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we are poor.” (FGD, 16.02.2015) Another woman adds: “[...] I think it is fair ... I don’t know 
about other people, but the village chief gave me the [Equity] card because I am poor and I am 
a widow.” (ibid.)  
So even though the identification of poor households should be based on objective criteria 
which are assessed through independent household interviews, the process is perceived as 
being controlled by the local leader. He is seen as responsible for selecting and distributing 
the benefits which are put on display by the IDPoor programme. The village chief himself 
backs this up by claiming he knows his villagers best and therefore, if some accounts in the 
interviews were not right, he could change them and the score accordingly (Informal talk, 
14.02.2015, paraphrased). Furthermore, he controls which households, if they were absent 
during the time the interviews were conducted, can register for exemption of public health 
care fees. Thereby, the households are not enlisted as poor, but gain the same health care 
benefits as the Equity Card offers.
10
 Another aspect of his influence on the process of 
identification is his control over the establishment and functioning of the Village 
Representative Group, as illustrated in the former chapter. The villagers are aware of this and 
perceive the VRG as steered by the village chief. To conclude, the communities’ 
understanding of the intervention is that it is influenced – if not controlled – by the village 
chief.  
The former quotations of the two women also indicate that the identification process 
creates tensions between the villagers. Even though many villagers perceive the influence of 
the village chief on the distribution process as something positive, also negative perceptions 
were revealed. A man, whose family is registered as poor, states: 
The selection is unfair, like I said. [...] Some people have a better live but they still 
get the [Equity] card. They [villagers] are jealous of each other. .... And some are 
the relatives of the village chief. After he [village chief] had selected, it was 
reported to the upper level [commune level], but the upper level doesn’t know. 
             (Interview at his house, 15.02.2015) 
He criticises not only nepotism but also irregularities when categorising the families. 
Within the community the families seem quite knowledgeable about the livelihood of each 
other. Crop yields, purchases of cows and work opportunities in factories or on construction 
                                                          
10
 This process is called post-identification for the Health Equity Funds, which grants free access to public health 
care services. Formally, poor households, who have not been identified as poor, can demand post-identification 
in the health centres or district hospital (Flores et al, 2013). However, only the village chief seems to know about 
this possibility and selects which households demand post-identification and facilitates the process.   
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sites were discussed which each other. Hence, the villagers are able to estimate and compare 
different household situations. Several villagers share the opinion that the village chief 
selectively favours families, even if their livelihoods are judged superior to other households 
which were not categorised as poor. This leads to tensions and disagreements and various 
villagers – categorised as poor and non-poor – stated they feel jealous, angry or upset about 
this.  
The influence of the village chief expands beyond the IDPoor programme and in order to 
understand his standing in the community and villager positioning towards him, his influence 
on other aspects of the villager’s lives will be presented. Overall, he manages the 
administrative aspects of the village life, like authorising lending contracts for microloans
11
, 
issuing work permissions for underage youth
12
, administrating marriages and divorces, or 
settling conflicts between the villagers and – if necessary – the amount of compensation 
payments. An illustrative example of the strong position of the village chief (and how 
villagers perceive it) is the management of donations. Donations, either from political parties 
or development organisations, are mostly handed out after destructive floods. Still, they 
appear irregularly and come as surprises to the community. Many villagers call them gifts and 
their distribution was a frequent subject of debate. During our stay in the village a donation in 
form of rice was given to a poor widow. The village chief had put forward a request regarding 
a donation for her at the commune council a few weeks earlier. When we talk about this with 
a poor family, which did not get an Equity Card, the husband tells us: 
I never get anything. [...] They [local authorities] gave the donations only to their 
relatives. It was not a big donation, only noodles, sugar, clothes, hats, 50 kilogram 
of rice... They gave it everywhere, but my house never gets anything from them.  
          (Interview at their house, 18.02.2015)  
  His wife adds:  
The only time we got something was from World Vision. During the flood season 
they gave us medicine to clean the water. Yes, that they gave us. [...] Besides this, 
every donation that is provided to our commune, if he [village chief] selects 50 or 
                                                          
11
 In order to obtain a microloan villagers provide their rice land as collateral to the lending organisation. Since 
legal land titling does not exist, three villagers need to confirm that the household who wants to obtain the credit 
owes the land. The village chief needs to sign this document before it can be sent to the organisation.  
12
 According to the law, persons less than 16 years old are not allowed to work in factories. However, if a family 
is depending on another income the village chief can issue special work permits. Many families emphasised the 
work of their teenage children (especially women in the garment sector) as an important source of income for 
their families. 
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60 poor people who get the donation in this village, I never get anything. But for 
those who are rich, they say they are still poor. [...] Even though we are angry we 
cannot do anything. [laugh] We are under their leading. 
   (ibid.) 
Thus, the village chief has a strong influence over the allocation of benefits. He and the 
‘upper level’ decide who will profit from donations, and even though some families feel 
neglected they see no possibility to challenge this situation. What is meant by ‘being under 
their leading’ is explored below.  
This theme indicates the very influential position of the village chief in Kaoh Moan, with 
a particular emphasis on his control over development interventions. He not only administers 
legal aspects and settles conflicts, he also manages the IDPoor intervention or donations.  
Villagers are aware of his influential position.  
5.3. Local Leadership- The Caretaking or Dismissing Village Chief  
The aforementioned perceptions of the community in regard to the allocation of 
development benefits relates to their overall perception of local leadership. There seem to 
exist two contrary opinions about the local leader and his leadership qualities in the 
community, which are explored in the third theme.  
5.3.1.  The Gentle and Wise Leader  
Some villagers describe the village chief as a parent, guardian or father. An elderly 
woman states in an interview: “The leaders are not different from our parents, because they 
always look after their children” (Interview at her house, 10.03.2015). Later, when we 
discussed how tensions are solved in the village she comes back to that metaphor and adds: 
“Yes, they [villagers] go to the village chief, and he does not resent us because he is like a 
parent. If he would resent us how could he have become a leader?” (ibid.). A young woman 
used a similar metaphor when explaining: “The village chief knows clearly [about the 
village]. If he would not, he could not be the guard of the villagers” (FGD, 16.02.2015). Even 
the poor family, which feels neglected by him, refers to him as a parent, yet in a negative 
comparison:  
If he [village chief] decides that we get the [Equity] card, we will get the card. If 
he does not give us the card, we will not get it. It is like in a family, when the 
parents love one child they give everything only to that child. This is like our 
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situation. We also want to have it [the Equity Card], because we are poor, but they 
don’t give to us. 
       (Interview at their house, 18.02.2015) 
A perception of authority and knowledge underpins all these metaphors and it is claimed 
the leaders take care of their villagers and look after them. Or, as in the case of the poor 
family, neglect them and favour another child, which also entails the notion of authority.  
Even the village chief describes himself as “the father of the villagers who takes care of 
them” (Informal talk at his house, 05.03.2015). He tells us that villagers seek his guidance 
when they are in debt or have other troubles and he advices them to work hard and to try not 
to depend on others (ibid.). During a conversation with a group of women it was argued that 
the leaders know what is best for the village, and therefore villagers should trust them 
(Informal talk, 06.03.2015, paraphrased). This adds the notion of wisdom and trust – apart 
from the already attributed characteristics of knowledge and authority – to a good leader.  
5.3.2. The Biased Leader  
In contrast to the former theme, a number of villagers perceive the village chief as being 
unfair and favouring himself, his relatives or rich families. He is perceived as being “good at 
making friends with the upper level” and “only takes care of people he likes” (Informal talks, 
11.03.2015).  
When discussing how conflicts are solved in the village with a group of women I asked if 
they turn to the village chief. All denied and said they rather settle their conflict on their own. 
One elderly mother gave an example of a conflict with another villager. Her son was taking 
care of the man’s ducks for three months but has not been paid. She said she approached the 
owner of the ducks several times, but he claimed not having the money to pay her son. When 
she finally went to the village chief he turned her down, arguing he could not do anything, as 
her son and the villager had no proper contract. She laughed about this and stated barely any 
work is done based on a formal contract in Kaoh Moan. She reasoned that the villager is rich 
and therefore, the village chief defended him. I asked if she complained about this to the 
deputy village chief or someone on commune level and she denies. She explains complaining 
at the commune is too expensive for her and overall she does not like complaining, as she 
does not want to break the relationship with the village chief (Informal talk, 07.03.2015, 
paraphrased).  
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During another discussion with a group of men and women the villagers complained 
about an incident which happened a few years ago. A development programme was donating 
three public pumps to the village. The villagers should decide jointly where to set the pumps. 
However, the village chief did not share all relevant information about the programme right 
away and influenced the process in a way that one public pump was built in his backyard. 
When the other villagers noticed this, the construction work had already started and it was too 
late to reallocate the pump. The village chief defended himself by pointing out he lives very 
central and villagers can just come and get water from the pump in his back yard (Informal 
talk, 11.03.2015, paraphrased). We observed how neighbours used the pump in the garden of 
the village chief and when we asked them about this they all claimed it is a public pump, 
therefore, they are entitled to use it.  
A similar story shared in the village relates to the case of the village veterinarian. As the 
village chief heard that a development organisation is providing free training and financial 
compensation for one villager per village to become trained as a veterinarian he sent one of 
his sons immediately. The villagers could not decide on this and reason that the village chief 
wanted to get the money the organisation provides (ibid.). 
So even though the village chief claims he is like the father for the villagers, some 
members regard him as favouring his own family and capitalising on development benefits. 
The villagers who perceive him like this prefer keeping a good but distant relation to him, 
while solving their problems by themselves. Other local authorities, like the commune 
council, are perceived as distant and inaccessible.  
To summarise the third theme, for some villagers, aspects like wisdom, authority and 
knowledge constitute a good leader and the community should trust and follow the village 
chief as he combines these characteristics. The distribution of development benefits according 
to his decision is accepted and should not be challenged. Yet, another group of villagers 
criticise the village chief for selective favouring when distribution development benefits or 
capitalising on them. These villagers try to keep a low and distant profile. Their perception of 
local leadership interrelates with their self-ascription as citizens. This will be explored in the 
next chapter. 
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5.4.  Strategies to Keep a Good Relation to the Leader – The Good Citizens and 
the Distant Villagers  
The aforementioned aspects illustrate the influential position of the village chief in Kaoh 
Moan and how the villagers perceive and judge this in regard to the IDPoor programme and 
their overall understanding of local leadership. The fourth theme emphasises the importance 
of a good relation to the village chief and villagers’ different strategies to secure this. 
In a former example the woman reasoned she did not complain when the village chief 
failed to support her claim against the owner of the ducks. She valued the good relation with 
the village chief to be more important than demanding his support. The link between a good 
relation to the village chief and obtaining the Equity Card was brought up by several members 
of the community. Even though only two elderly men mentioned this relation directly during a 
conversation, many villagers reflect on the bad relationship between the village chief and 
certain families when discussing cases they perceive as unfair. One villager reasons on the 
case of a very poor woman who did not get the Equity Card:  
There is an old woman, not married, who lived behind that house. [points across 
the street] She did not get the [Equity] card. Her house was falling down and she 
went to Thailand.
13
 Now nobody knows where she lives... She had nothing. [...] 
She is very old, she is poor and her house was falling down, but the village chief 
thinks nothing of her. 
     (Interview at his house, 18.02.2015) 
After he explained her difficulties and hardship for over a minute he concludes by 
reckoning her bad relation with the village chief. Even though he does not directly claim this 
as cause, he indicates that the village chief’s negative perception of her influenced her 
classification as non-poor. Another illustrative example constitutes the case of a very poor 
family, who lives in a simple shed and has not been categorised as poor. The deputy village 
chief explains he had lobbied for the family at the commune council and talked to the village 
chief directly, but nothing happened. He reasons that: “The village chief does not get along 
well with [...] [them]. Maybe [...] [he] dislikes her, that’s why he ignores her” (Interview at 
his house, 08.03.2015). Lastly, the commissioner of the pond tells us that he had a conflict 
with the village chief regarding some trees near the pond. He chopped them down to build an 
additional wall for the pond, albeit the village chief prohibited this. He claims this could be 
                                                          
13
 We counted six families which have been migrating all together to Thailand, to work on construction sides or 
in factories, to strive for a living. According to the village chief these were landless or very poor families. Other 
families have sent either one or two family members or left their children with the grandparents to work in 
Thailand.  
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the reason why the village chief is mad at him and did not give him an Equity Card (Informal 
talk, 03.03.2015, paraphrased). Thus, as indicated in theme 2, villagers are aware of the 
village chief’s influence over the allocation of development benefits. In order to obtain 
development benefits, like the Equity Card, they perceive a positive relation to him as 
prerequisite.  
One strategy to ensure a positive relation is behaving appropriately – like a “good or easy 
citizen”. An elder widow mentioned the concept of being an easy citizen when reasoning why 
she got an Equity Card. “[T]hey [local authorities] saw that I am very hard-working in order 
to feed my children and the village chief gave me the card because he can see with his own 
eyes that I am an easy citizen.” (Interview at her house, 10.03.2015) When inquiring what she 
means by being an easy citizen she elaborates: “For example, when they [local authorities] 
collect some money I never complain and I will give them the money if they need it” (ibid.). 
Every now and then the village chief collects public fees from the villagers, around 2.000 to 
8.000 Riel, for maintaining the roads or the public ponds. This is debated between the 
villagers, as some families claim the money is misallocated by the village chief or the 
commune. Therefore, several families try to avoid paying the fee. The widow explains:  
Sometimes the village chief and sometimes the deputy come to collect some 
money. [...] Some people did not give the money. But for me, I always gave the 
money whenever they came to collect it. I am never against them. Although I do 
not have money, I borrow money from other people to give it to them, because I 
live in this society and I do not want to be difficult for them. This is my duty. [...] 
But some people they never give the money. 
            (ibid.) 
For her, not to criticise, not to be against ‘them’ and to supply what ‘they’ demand – even 
through running into debt – is seen as the responsibility of a good citizen who is member of 
Kaoh Moan. 
Another characteristic regarded appropriate for an ‘easy citizen’ is not to talk negatively 
about the local leaders or complaining too much. During a conversation concerning conflict 
resolution in the village with a group of women it was discussed how a “good citizen” should 
behave. Here the concept had a different connotation. A couple of women in the group agreed 
that a good citizen does not talk negatively about the local authorities outside public meetings. 
The women explained a few people are always against the leaders as they constantly complain 
and talk badly about the village chief. The group agreed, that there are enough village 
meetings for people to complain and that the leaders are willing to listen. However, the 
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villagers never raise any complaints officially, instead they criticise the village chief outside 
the meetings. The women regarded this as unsuitable behaviour and one woman explained:  
People should work hard and go to the Pagoda to pray ... Not think and complain 
the whole time. And they should not get involved in other family’s issues. No, 
they should not. 
                         (Informal talk, 06.03.2015) 
The perception of complaints as inappropriate has to be understood in relation to the 
already mentioned perception of leadership. If notions of wisdom, knowledge and authority 
form villagers’ understanding of the village chief, challenging him seems improper. 
Perceiving the village chief as guard or father of the village indicates his superiority which 
shall not be questioned but accepted. This is also indicated through the permanent emphasis of 
the difference between citizens and leaders by the villagers.  
Yet, even though all villagers agree on the small amount of complaints brought forward 
officially, not all reason this is due to the inappropriateness of complaining. Some villagers 
claimed they “do not know how to complain” (Interview, 18.02.2015), “do not dare to talk” 
(Interview, 17.02.2015), or “are lazy to complain, as nothing ever changes” (Interview, 
18.02.2015). When discussing the case of the family which feels neglected with their relatives 
a woman tells us: “We do not dare to complain. We just can be silent. If we get the Equity 
Card we are happy, if not, there is nothing we can do” (Informal talk at her house, 
11.03.2015). This is in line with her daughters’ statement that: “Even though we are angry we 
cannot do anything. [laugh] We are under their leading.” (Interview at her house, 18.02.2015). 
This indicates helplessness and resignation the villagers feel when it comes to challenging the 
distribution practices and the power of the leader. A clear separation between being a citizen 
and a leader is emphasised. In this case, complaining is not just perceived as unsuitable 
behaviour, but also insecurity about how and where to complain limits villager’s actions.  
A young woman reasons complaining would be more effective if organised as a 
collective action: 
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If they [villagers] agree to complain it can work out. But if only some people are 
going to complain, but some people are not joining in, it can’t be done. ... It’s like 
what I was doing in the factory. [...] For example if there are 2,000 workers and 
they want to make a strike, they are going together, so there is no problem. But if 
only some workers are making a strike and some workers not, they [factory 
owners] will ask who are the leaders of the group and they will face some 
problems. It’s like that in the village. 
(Interview at her house, 03.03.2015) 
Thus, apart from insecurity, individual complaining is seen as ineffective and dangerous. 
It could even lead to negative consequences and harm the relationship with the local leaders.  
In sum, villagers perceive having a good relation to the village chief as a pre-requisite, to 
obtain the Equity Card. What defines a good relation and adequate behaviour is related to 
their self-perception. Some villagers describe themselves as a ‘good or easy citizen’, which 
characterises someone who provides what the leaders demand without questioning them. 
Moreover, not challenging local leaders and not getting involved in other family’s issues is 
perceived as appropriate conduct of a good citizen. Yet, silence is not always grounded in 
satisfaction with the leader or a certain social norm. Rather, insecurity and fear seem to be the 
driving motivations for other villagers to not bring forwards criticism and to sustain the good 
relation to the leader. Bother perspectives emphasise a sharp distinction between being a 
citizen in comparison to being a leader, while the relation is perceived as highly hierarchical. 
Yet, the ‘good citizens’ did not voice concern or discontent about this relationship. For them it 
constitutes the ‘natural social order’, which is grounded in the leaders’ wisdom and 
trustworthiness. For the other villagers, the hierarchical relationship is perceived as limiting 
their actions, as they do not know how to challenge it. They are afraid of sanctions and do not 
dare to officially complain. 
 
6. Analysis 
Within this chapter the adaptation of the participatory features of the IDPoor intervention 
by villagers’ actions – which are shaped by the local power structures – will be analysed. The 
focus is put on the participatory aspects as they are regarded as ‘development interfaces’ in 
which different life-worlds intersect. In these interfaces various villagers with different 
interests, perceptions, social positions and capacities to exercise power interact and shape the 
ways in which the IDPoor intervention is adapted by the community. These processes have to 
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be understood in a holistic way, whereby the exercised powers in the different dimensions 
overlap and mutually influence, enforce or limit each other.  
The overall question this work tries to answer reads as follow: How does the Kaoh Moan 
community adapt the ‘Identification of Poor Households’ intervention to its pre-existing 
social structures? In order to do that, first the establishment and functioning of the VRG is 
analysed. I illustrate how the village chief was able to expand and consolidate his power 
through strategically withholding knowledge and mobilising social norms related to his social 
status. This has to be understood in relation to villagers’ self-perception as (inferior) citizens 
and their experiences with former development interventions. Therefore, in second part of the 
analysis the village consultation meeting is scrutinised and I illustrate how villagers' self-
identification and the structures of domination respectively limited their behaviour during the 
meeting. Yet, these structures also enabled certain response strategies and hidden resistance, 
which will be represented as a complementary model of explanation for the behaviour during 
the village consultation meeting. 
6.1.  The Village Representative Group – Consolidating and Expanding Power 
through Capturing a Participatory Approach 
Analysing the establishment and functioning of the VRG reveals the dynamics and 
processes through which the village chief was able to manipulate and control the primary 
responsible institution for managing the intervention on the local level. The analysis illustrates 
how actions in the hidden power dimension enforced dynamics in the visible one. 
As outlined, the IDPoor intervention is supposed to be implemented according to a 
detailed implementation manual which assigns clear responsibilities to the different bodies 
involved. The VRG is supposed to constitute an independent and legitimised group of 
villagers who are responsible for the implementation of the intervention on the village level. 
Official rules regarding the establishment, group consultations and voting mechanisms set the 
framework of their actions. Hence, the implementation manual demarcates regulations for 
decision-making processes positioned within the visible dimension of power. Yet, the village 
chief was able to influence these formalised exercises of power and seized control over the 
group. In order to understand this processes it is necessary to scrutinise the consequences of 
assigning himself head of the VRG. Even though this action occurred within the hidden 
dimension of power, it broadened and consolidated his power in the visible power dimension.  
 Stefanie Licht 
Masters of Science in Development Studies 
Graduate School & Department of Sociology 
 
45 
 
According to the village chief the implementation manual determines that every village 
chief serves as head of the VRG in his community. His claim is based on a formal rule which 
allegedly delegates him this position, albeit this is not specified in the manual. He is the only 
member of the community who knows the implementation manual, and he uses this 
knowledge strategically for his interests. Referring to his appointment as a formal requirement 
from the local government adds a notion of external authority to his claim. Through 
demanding the position as head of the VRG he influenced the ‘rules of the game’ and thereby 
delegated himself into a position which enabled him to manipulate succeeding steps of 
implementation. This position ascribed him various authorities in the further course of 
categorising the households and legitimated his influence. The findings indicate three ways in 
which power is exercised to manipulate decision-making processes of the VRG: 
a) by mobilising and expanding his authorative resources  
b) by monopolising formalised joint decision processes  
c) by excluding less powerful groups  
The first aspect is illustrated through the constitution of the VRG and how the village 
chief was able to control it. The group was not publicly elected, rather its formation was 
influenced by the village chief. Their narrow understanding of their scope of work limits the 
members’ engagement in the implementation process. They perceive the village chief as their 
supervisor and comply with his decisions. Disputing a decision of the head of the VRG seems 
out of question for them. Thereby, the village chief is able to access, mobilise and expand his 
authorative resources. He gained influence over the actions and self-perception of the VRG 
members, as he tells them what to do and defines their scope of work. He possesses the 
capacity to pass his commands on to them and to enrol them, at least partially, in his personal 
agenda. Thereby, the VRG loses its participatory claim – neither are the members legitimised 
by the community, nor do they find joined decisions based on their local knowledge. 
Another way in which the implementation of the intervention became framed by the 
village chief is through seizing the tasks of the VRG. An illustrative example constitutes his 
monopolisation of the re-categorisation of households. As not all relevant aspects defining a 
households’ situation can be reflected in the questionnaire, the VRG shall jointly discuss all 
cases where special circumstances would justify re-assigning a different poverty category. 
(Ministry of Planning, 2008:17-18). However, this cooperative task has been captured by the 
village chief. He excluded the VRG from the decision-making process, thereby transforming 
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the practice from a public, transparent one to a closed one happening ‘behind the scenes’. 
Hence, he re-allocated the re-categorisation of households from the visible to the hidden 
dimension of power. Once the decision process is allocated within the hidden dimension he 
can exercise power as participation is banned. He was able to do this based on withholding 
information regarding the official process and the ascribed authority and legitimation rooted 
in his position as head of the VRG, which results in him controlling the VRG.  
A third way of executing power based on this authority is by excluding less powerful 
households. Again, through manipulating the ‘rules of the game’ in the hidden dimension, he 
was able to select which households will be interviewed. Thereby, he pre-determines who will 
potentially benefit from this intervention.  
An example how this exercise of power within the hidden dimension leads to the 
exclusion of less powerful households is the case of Sokunthy
14
 and her family. I referred to 
Sokunthy’s case throughout the findings as the poor family which feels neglected. I discussed 
her case with herself and her husband, her mother, some neighbours and the village deputy 
chief.
15
 Sokunthy’s family had not been interviewed. She does not know why or how she 
could demand to be assessed. Many neighbours perceive her family as poor and her case has 
been a subject of debate. The deputy village chief lobbied for her case at the Commune 
Council and talked to the village chief directly – yet nothing changed. Sokunthy and her 
family see no way to challenge their treatment. They feel neglected by the village chief, yet 
perceive themselves under his leading. This case illustrates the leader’s manipulation of the 
preliminary setting, before the assessment of the households started. As a kind of a pre-
decision, the village chief dismissed Sokunthy’s family from the list of households which will 
be assessed. Now, in the visible arena of decision-making processes she cannot draw on any 
means – neither rules nor resources – to influence this. She can only manoeuvre within a very 
limited space, as the structures of domination are constituted to her disadvantage. According 
to the implementation manual the VRG is responsible for such cases. Yet, as the leader 
influenced the constitution and restricted the tasked and thereby the self-conception of the 
VRG, they do not perceive themselves responsible for this case.  
In summary, it becomes clear how the village chief was able to generate and use 
authorative resources, manipulated formal rules to his advantage, and used information 
strategically in order to expand his control over the programme on the village level. He is 
                                                          
14
 Name changed. 
15
 The neighbours and the deputy chief brought up her case by themselves. 
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capable to influence the official implementation procedures by re-allocating decision-making 
processes from the public to the hidden sphere, thereby limiting participation. At the same 
time, through assigning himself head of the VRG, he expanded and consolidated his power in 
the visible dimension. Thereby, a network of actors emerged, which – at least partially – 
supported his agenda. Thereby, this study reaches a conclusion similar to Nuijeten’s research 
discussed in the literature review. She argues that newly-established community-level 
organisations in natural resource management programmes are often assumed to regulate and 
manage relatively homogeneous communities, without acknowledging differentiations among 
the rural community or pre-existing informal modes of organisation (Nuijeten, 2005). This 
claim can be extended to the design of the VRG. The organisation was supposed to control the 
influence of local power holders. Instead, through disregarding the communities 
heterogeneous nature and pre-existing modes of organisation embedded in the overall power 
asymmetry the VRG did not challenge the pre-existing structures but was rather channelled 
along them. 
These processes were facilitated by social rules, internalised norms and self-perceptions of 
the villagers and the VRG members. In order to coherently analyse the ways in which the 
intervention became adapted and shaped by local power structures these practices have to 
form a part of the analysis and will be addressed in the next chapter.  
6.2.  The Village Consultation Meeting – A Feature Disregarding Social Norms  
As emphasised in the former chapter, the village chief gaining the position as head of the 
VRG is a key aspect in understanding how the intervention became shaped and 
accommodated by local power structures of Kaoh Moan. He was able to assign himself this 
position, as nobody questioned it, neither the villagers nor the VRG members. This has to be 
understood in relation to the community’s history of development interventions and villagers’ 
awareness of the important social position of the leader in every-day life. This chapter 
discusses how villager’s understanding of leadership and their self-ascription as citizens 
influenced their actions during the village consultation meeting. Thereby, the lack of 
contextualisation of this participatory feature is revealed, as it disregards social norms and 
self-ascriptions – rooted in the structures of domination – in Kaoh Moan. 
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6.2.1.  Being a Good Citizen  
The invisible dimension of power conceptualises how domination leads to the 
internalisation and acceptance of certain values, social norms and self-perceptions of the 
relatively powerless, which results in consenting and adapting to being dominated. Some 
villagers defined themselves as ‘good or easy citizen’, which exemplifies how power renders 
certain aspects invisible.  
A good citizen neither complains, nor challenges the leader, as he is perceived as wise and 
skilled father, who takes care of his villagers. A notion of authority and gratitude is attached 
to this. Within this mind-set speaking up is perceived as unsuitable behaviour, as well as 
getting involved in other families’ issues. The instructions or commands of the leader should 
be accepted and followed, even if that increases personal hardship. In general, a good citizen 
has a good relation to leaders and does “not want to be difficult for them” (Interview, 
10.03.2015). The hierarchy and strong position of the leader constitutes the accepted natural 
social order for a ‘good citizen’.  
This internalisation of domination and the acceptance of a social order which 
disadvantages the villagers form part of their tactical consciousness. The ‘good citizens’ are 
unable to reflect on this. The social practices based on this understanding, like paying public 
fees without questioning the allocation, or accepting the distribution of the Equity Cards, as 
the leader decided this – are internalised and reproduced in an unreflective manner. Hence, 
situated knowledge and self-perception influence the ways in which the interventions 
becomes adapted by ‘good citizens’.  
This interplay between the villagers’ unconscious submission to domination and the 
IDPoor intervention can be illustrated through scrutinising the village consultation meeting. 
During the meeting villagers are expected to put forward complaints or suggestions regarding 
the preliminary categorisation, thereby addressing conflicts and reaching consensus. The 
meeting takes place in public and is directed towards community action. The findings indicate 
that only very few complaints were brought up during the meeting, which the village chief 
interprets as affirmation of the intervention.  
The gap between the features’ rationale and villagers’ actions based on self-perception 
and internalised norms is apparent in several ways. Firstly, as the findings emphasise, the 
intervention is perceived as being controlled by the village chief. Thereby, the course of 
implementation is legitimate, justified and beyond doubt, as the leader is perceived as more 
 Stefanie Licht 
Masters of Science in Development Studies 
Graduate School & Department of Sociology 
 
49 
 
knowledgeable than a ‘good citizens’. Therefore, it does not occur to the ‘good citizen’ to 
speak up during such a meeting. Frankly, there is just no reason for them to do so, as they 
trust and accept the decisions made by the leader. Thereby, ideas and perspectives are not just 
kept from the decision-making table, as power exercised in the second dimension would 
indicate, but generally from the minds of the agents. This indicates internalised domination – 
a form of power exercised in the third dimension. Secondly, even if speaking up during the 
meeting would occur to a ‘good citizen’ it would be regarded as defiant or disobedient to the 
village chief. The social norm that complaining is perceived as inacceptable behaviour 
influences villagers’ actions, especially in such an open setting. Given the norm it is no 
surprise that barely any complaints were made. Hence, conducting such a meeting always 
happens within the structures of domination characterising the village, which limits agents’ 
actions. ‘Good citizens’ behaviour during the meeting is shaped through the social norms and 
self-perceptions grounded in the accepted domination. Through this adaptation along the 
structures of domination and the influence of the third dimension of power, the feature 
becomes a self-serving activity and loses its purpose. 
6.2.2. Tactical Submission  
Another aspect shaping the adaption of the intervention is the villagers’ submission to 
domination as strategic, deliberate decision. This can be seen as response-strategy to the 
village chief’s control over development resources. 
The community perceives the intervention as controlled by the village chief and all 
villagers stressed the importance of a good relation to the village leader. This 
knowledgeability about the social context of Kaoh Moan guides their behaviour in regards to 
the intervention. They tactically subordinate to the domination as a strategy to minimise 
extraction while benefiting from potential resources. In contrast to the ‘good citizen’ they 
perceive submission and acceptance not as duty. Rather they position themselves in a way to 
avoid direct insubordination, while withdrawing themselves from the influence of the leader 
as far as possible. This mediates how the IDPoor intervention is accommodated by them, 
which can be exemplified through scrutinising the village consultation meeting.  
These villagers perceive complaining as ineffective, grounded in their experiences, that 
the leaders are un-responsive. Within their understanding, complaining will not change their 
situation, yet it can backfire, as the fear of sanctions and punishment indicates. The villager 
stated they did not dare to complain during the village meeting, as they did not want to 
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jeopardise the good relation with the village chief. Thereby, open confrontation is avoided and 
the meeting fails its purpose. Hence, the village chief’s threat or use of sanctions influenced 
their actions, which illustrates how he exercised power over them, as they would have acted 
otherwise if it would not have been for the leader’s influence.  
Yet, villagers do resist and try to manoeuvre themselves in an advantageous position 
within their limiting structures of domination. Illustrative is the strategy to hide information 
during the assessment by the VRG. Through withholding information and making false 
statements families attempt to appear poorer in order to receive the Equity Card. This 
indicates tactical resistance in order to capitalise on benefits. As the unequal distribution of 
rules and resources limits their possibilities to act, they pursue this strategy to benefit from the 
development resources while not risking the good relation with the village chief or 
confronting him directly. Another example poses the village chief’s complaint on how 
difficult it is to collect public fees within Kaoh Moan. He claims villagers try to avoid him or 
search for excuses or argue to avoid paying. They have a practical interest in resisting him, in 
order to minimise extractions. This emphasises that even subordinate agents poses some 
capacity to exercise power. Although the structures of domination restrict villager’s actions, 
they also enable them to pursue certain strategies. 
So even though public transcripts, like silently participating in different village meetings, 
display that these villagers accept the subordination unchallenged, hidden transcripts reveal a 
different picture.
16
 Tactical positioning and hidden forms of resistance indicate that villagers 
are aware of the power relations. They strategically select where to resist and where to 
comply. This motivation shaped their actions during the village consultation meeting, 
whereby the feature – through dismissing local power structures – does not function as the 
control mechanism it is intended to provide, but rather plays into the hands of the local leader.  
In sum, the village consultation meeting constitutes a forum which disregards the cultural 
context and the local social relations of Kaoh Moan. The idea of a collective, public event 
directed towards community action is not in concurrence with the local norms and embodied 
power relations. A leader is constructed as beyond doubt and challenging him would 
constitute a cultural affront. Moreover, out of fear and/or strategic positioning, villagers only 
express the ‘official’ and accepted view while criticism is held back. Thereby, the feature 
                                                          
16
 This nicely illustrates the purpose and usefulness of an ethnographic approach, as a thorough understanding of 
peoples everyday lived experiences is gained, which enables the ethnographer to ‘look behind’ the front-stage 
behaviour and to research ‘hidden transcripts’. 
 Stefanie Licht 
Masters of Science in Development Studies 
Graduate School & Department of Sociology 
 
51 
 
triggers front-stage action and public consent instead of a debate in which various opinions 
from different groups of the community are discussed.  
 
7. Discussion and Conclusion 
This case study set out to gain an insight into the processes that happen at the interface where 
“development interventions encounter local life-worlds” (Hasselskog, 2009:11). Given the 
explorative ethnographic approach, the focus of the research was gradually narrowed down, 
as my understanding of the context broadened. After the fieldwork, the empirical material was 
comprehended through the lens of a tailor-made theoretical framework discussing power 
based on conceptualisations of Giddens, Lukes and Scott. Yet, interpreting and sense-making 
occurred throughout all stages of the research.  
The final research question reads as follows: How does the Kaoh Moan community adapt 
the ‘Identification of Poor Households’ intervention to its pre-existing social structures? 
A focus is put on the two participatory features of the intervention, where different actors 
interact to accommodate, shape and translate the intervention in accordance with their 
interests. In order to analyse this question the following sub-questions will be addressed:  
1. How are the communities’ perceptions of the intervention related to their historical 
experiences with development programmes?  
2. How are dimensions of power essential in understanding the process of adaptation? 
3. How do the local power structures limit and enable villagers’ actions when engaging 
with the IDPoor intervention? 
The analysis indicate that the community’s history with development interventions, a 
hierarchical social order, self-identification as inferior citizen and, related to that, certain local 
social norms influence the way the IDPoor programme is adapted. These aspects are 
constituted and constitute the local power structures, which limit and enable the villagers’ 
thoughts and actions in relation to the intervention. The village chief expands and 
consolidates his influence over the interventions through controlling the VRG, monopolising 
formalised joint decision processes and banning participation, thereby drawing on his special 
social position within the community. Villagers’ actions are influenced by the internalisation 
of domination as well as the perceived inferiority, which limits their capacity to reflect on or 
to challenge the monopolisation of the project by the leader. Yet, some villagers consciously 
adjust their behaviour to the domination and strategically comply with the leader while 
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resisting in less obvious ways. Hence, the interventions assumption that local group dynamics 
would lead to participatory and consensus-oriented decisions as well as the inclusion of less 
powerful groups is refuted. Rather, the interests of the already powerful actors were 
reproduced.  
Four key elements that characterise power relations in Kaoh Moan and the adaptation of 
the IDPoor programme could be identified. Firstly, the formal and visible institutions, like the 
power of the village chief to manage everyday life in Kaoh Moan. Secondly, informal 
structures like norms and beliefs, which constitute the embodied form of power, for example 
the concept of being a good citizen. Thirdly, villager’s interests, like the desire to capitalise on 
the development benefits, and fourthly, the processes of cooperation and contestation, like 
tactical submission to obtain these benefits. The study highlights that all these aspects 
mutually affect each other and steer the ways in which the intervention unfolds in the village.  
Conceptualising power as a – shaping but also shaped – aspect of individual choices and 
structural elements illuminates how the dynamics villagers’ actions give rise to (re)produce 
power and (re)create the structures of domination (Hausgaard, 1992:2). The intervention 
facilitates the reproduction of unequal power relations through villagers’ conscious and 
unconscious actions which embody these unequal relations. The community understands 
development interventions as putting benefits on display – benefits like the Equity Card. The 
leaders’ management of the interventions constitutes the ‘normal course of events’. In order to 
be able to capitalise on these development benefits, it is considered necessary to have a good 
relation with the chief. This local knowledge and villagers’ interest in the benefits lead to 
actions which play into the hands of the leader, as villagers submit voluntarily or out of 
strategic choice. Hence, introducing the IDPoor programme led to a situation in which the 
village chiefs gained control over a new resource which he can distribute in accordance with 
his interests. Villagers’ awareness of this forms part of the strategies they pursue and they 
adapt the intervention in ways which reproduce these unequal social relations.  
The analysis reveals that the social context of Kaoh Moan has only partly been considered 
when designing the intervention. As Olivier de Sardan put nicely: “the natural tendency of 
any project is to assume that history begins with the project, to underestimate everything that 
came before and to overestimate its own impact” (Olivier de Sardan, 2005:139).  
The community’s long history with various development interventions shapes the local’s 
understanding of the IDPoor programme as distributing personal benefits one can capitalise 
on, if self-represented in accordance with the intervention’s objective. In the case under study 
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this means presenting oneself and the own family as poor. Hence, the community’s history 
which affects villager’s rationalities in relation to development interventions had not been 
taken into account when designing the programme.  
Also local power structures have only partly been addressed, which is illustrated by the 
design of the participatory features. The understanding of power underlying the 
conceptualisation of the features is too simplistic and positivistic, as only formal rules of 
decision-making processes in the visible dimension are reflected. It is assumed that the 
community forms a harmonious entity, whereby power relations or riffs between different 
groups are concealed. The intervention’s approach to diffuse power in decision-making 
processes through establishing formal rules of procedures neglects the processes of power 
operating behind the scenes or through internalised forms of domination and willing 
submission.  
The research indicates further areas of investigation, like analysing the ways in which the 
local knowledge of the community reflects local power structures. Thereby, the focus would 
shift on the influence of local knowledge on the process of adapting the IDPoor intervention, 
which might reveals other relevant dynamics to understand how power shapes the unfolding 
of development interventions. 
To summarise, the study illustrates how ethnographic research contributes to a more 
complex understanding of power in development settings in particular and the unfolding and 
adaptation of development projects by the context in general. The analysis shows that 
interventions designed by outside experts fail to address the specific social context the 
intervention will be introduced to. Even though participatory designs claim to address these 
shortcomings, the case under study reveals how features disregarding the interwoven 
dynamics of power, history and social norms only serve as rubber stamp activities instead of 
fostering the inclusion of marginalised groups and safeguarding against elite capture. Hence, 
through an actor-oriented development ethnography and sustained empirical engagement with 
development phenomena social logics can be entangled (Olivier de Sardan, 2005:11) and 
development interventions can be tailored more adequately in response to the specific context 
they will intervene in.  
 
 
 Stefanie Licht 
Masters of Science in Development Studies 
Graduate School & Department of Sociology 
 
54 
 
References 
 
Andrews T., 2012. What is Social Constructivism? Grounded Theory Review, 1(11), [online] 
 Available at: <http://groundedtheoryreview.com> [Accessed: 22 January 2015]. 
Arce A. and Long N., 1992. The dynamics of knowledge. Interfaces between bureaucrats and 
 peasants. In: Long N. And Long A. (eds). Battlefields of knowledge. The interlocking of 
 theory and practice in social research and development. London: Routledge, pp:211-246. 
Atkinson P., 2015. Working with Ethnographic Fieldnotes: Learning Tango. In: SAGE 
 Research Methods: SAGE Publications Ltd. Available through: Lund University Library 
 website http://lub.lu.se [Accessed: 20 June 2015]. 
Bierschenk T., Chauveau J.P., Olivier de Sardan J.P., 2002. Local development brokers in 
Africa: The rise of a new social category. Working Paper No. 13, Department of 
Anthropology and African Studies, Mainz, Germany: Johannes Gutenberg University. 
Braun V., and Clarke V., 2006. Using thematic analysis in psychology. Qualitative Research 
  in Psychology, 3(2), pp:77-101. 
Biggs J., 2014. Indigenous knowledge and development. In: Desai V. and Potter R. (eds). The 
Companion to Development Studies, 3
rd
 ed., New York: Routledge, pp: 127-131.  
Biggs J. and Sharp J., 2004. Indigenous knowledges and development: A postcolonial 
caution. In: Third World Quarterly, 25, pp:661-676. 
Bryant C. and Jary D., 1991. Giddens’ Theory of Structuration. A critical appreciation. 
 London: Routledge. 
Clegg S.R., 1989. Frameworks of Power. London: SAGE Publications Ltd.  
Clegg S.R. and Haugaard, M., 2009. Why Power is the Central Concept of the Social 
 Sciences. In: Clegg S.R. and Haugaard, M., (eds) The SAGE Handbook of Power.  
  London: SAGE Publications Ltd, pp:1-24. 
Cook B. and Kothari U., 2001. Participation: The new Tyranny? London: Zed.  
Council for the Development of Cambodia, 2015a. Donor Development Cooperation 
 Programmes. [web-page] Available at: <http://www.cdc- crdb.gov.kh/cdc/donor_country
  _pro.htm> [Accessed 7 August 2015]. 
Council for the Development of Cambodia, 2015b. The Cambodia NGO Database, Reporting 
 Year 2015. [web-page] Available at: <http://cdc.khmer.biz/ngo/summary/summary.asp> 
 [Accessed 7 August 2015]. 
Crang M. And Cook I., 2007. Doing Ethnographies. London: SAGE Publications Ltd. 
 Stefanie Licht 
Masters of Science in Development Studies 
Graduate School & Department of Sociology 
 
55 
 
Desai V. and Potter R.B., 2006. Doing Development Research. [e-book] London: SAGE 
 Publications Ltd. Available through: Lund University Library website http://lub.lu.se 
 [Accessed: 08 February 2015]. 
Easterly W., 2006. The White Man’s Burden: Why the West’s Efforts to Aid the Rest Have 
Done So Much Ill and So Little Good. New York: The Penguin Press. 
Emerson R., Fretz R., Shaw L., 1995. Writing Ethnographic Fieldnotes. Chicago: University 
 of Chicago Press. 
Emerson R., Fretz R., Shaw L., 2001. Participant Observations and Fieldnotes. In: Atkinson 
 P., Coffey A., Delamont S., et al (eds). Handbook of Ethnography. London: SAGE 
 Publications Ltd., pp:352-369.  
Escobar A., 1995. Encountering Development: The Making and Unmaking of the Third 
 World. Princeton: Princeton University Press.  
Feldman M., Bell J., Berger M., 2003. Gaining Access: A Practical and Theoretical Guide for
  Qualitative Researchers. Walnut Creek: AltaMira Press. 
Flores G., et al, 2013. Financial protection of patients through compensation of providers: The 
 impact of Health Equity Funds in Cambodia. In: Journal of Health Economics, 32(6), pp: 
 1180-1193. 
Gardner K., 2012. Discordant Development: Global Capitalism and the Struggle for 
 Connection in Bangladesh. London: Pluto. 
Giddens A., 1984. The Constitution of Society. Outline of the Theory of Structuration. 
 Cambridge: Polity Press. 
Giddens A., 1979. Central Problems in Social Theory. London: University of California   
 Press.  
Giddens A., 1977. Studies in social and political theory. New York: Basic Books. 
GIZ, 2015. Targeting Urban Poverty: IDPoor to expand to Cities. [blog] Available at:  
  <http://giz-cambodia.com/targeting-urban-poverty-idpoor-to-expand-to-cities> 
 [Accessed 18 July 2015].  
GIZ, n.d.. Identification of poor households. [web-page] Available at:
 <http://www.giz.de/en/worldwide/17300.html> [Accessed 16 January 2015]. 
Gomez G.M., Corradi P.G., Namara R., et al (eds) 2010. Participation for What: Social 
Change or Social Control? The Hauge: ISS and Hivos. 
 Stefanie Licht 
Masters of Science in Development Studies 
Graduate School & Department of Sociology 
 
56 
 
Gottlieb A., 2006. Ethnographic Methods: Ethnography – Theory and Methods. In: Perecman 
 E., and Curran S. (eds). A Handbook for Social Science Field Research: Essays & 
 Bibliographic Sources on Research Design and Methods. [e-book] Thousand Oaks, CA: 
 SAGE Publications Ltd. pp:47-85. Available through: Lund University Library website 
 http://lub.lu.se [Accessed: 24 January 2015].   
Guest G. and McLellan E., 2003. Distinguishing the trees from the forest: Applying Cluster 
  Analysis to Thematic Qualitative Data. Field Methods, 15(2): 186-201. 
Haugaard M., 2011. Reflections upon power, legitimacy and the constitution of the social 
 subject. Journal of Political Power, 4(2): 161–167. Available through: Lund University 
 Library website http://lub.lu.se [Accessed: 03 June 2015]. 
Haugaard M., 2003. Reflections on Seven Ways of Creating Power. European Journal of 
 Social Theory, 6(1), pp:87-113. Available through: Lund University Library website 
 http://lub.lu.se [Accessed: 03 June 2015]. 
Haugaard M., 1992. Structures, Restructuration and Social Power. Aldershot: Ashgate 
 Publishing. 
Hardcastle MA., Usher K., Holmes C., 2005. An overview on structuration theory and its 
 usefulness for nursing research. Nursing Philosophy, 6(4), pp:223-234. 
Hammersley M. and Attkinson P., 2007. Ethnography: Principles in Practice. 3
rd
 ed., New 
 York: Taylor & Francis. 
Hasselskog M., 2009. Development Intervention on the Ground. Inherent rationales of aid 
 and their encounter with local dynamics in three Cambodian villages. Ph.D. University 
 of Gothenburg.  
Hekman S., 1983. From epistemology to ontology: Gadamer's hermeneutics and 
 Wittgensteinian social science, Human Studies, 6, pp.:205-224.  
Li T., 2007. The Will to Improve. Governmentality, Development and the Practice of Politics. 
 Durham: Duke University Press. 
Hoben A., 1995. Paradigms and politics: the cultural construction of environmental policy in 
Ethiopia. In: World Development, 6, pp:1007-1022.  
Lewis D. and Mosse D., (eds) 2006. Encountering order and disjuncture: contemporary 
anthropological perspectives on the organisation of development. In: Oxford 
Development Studies, 34(1), pp:1-13. 
 Stefanie Licht 
Masters of Science in Development Studies 
Graduate School & Department of Sociology 
 
57 
 
Lindsjö K., 2012. Research in a development setting: Ethical concerns during fieldwork in 
 Tanzania. In: Jacobson K. and Sjöberg K. (eds). Pondering on Methods. A variety of 
 methodological concerns. Lund University. 
Long N. and Villarreal M., 2004. Exploring Development Interfaces: From the Transfer of 
 Knowledge to the Transformation of Meaning. In: Schuurman, F. (ed). Beyond the 
 impasse: New directions in development theory. London: Zed, pp: 140-168 
Long N., 2001. Development Sociology – Actors Perspective. London: Routledge. 
Long N. and Long A, 1992. Battlefields of knowledge. The interlocking of theory and practice 
 in social research and development. London: Routledge. 
Luckmann T., 2008. On social interaction and the communicative construction of personal 
 identity, knowledge and reality. Organisation Studies, 29, pp:277-290.  
Lukes S., 2005. Power: A radical view. 2
nd
 ed, New York: Pallgrave Mcmillan Ltd. 
Marvasti A.B. (ed), 2004. Qualitative Research in Sociology. [e-book] London: SAGE 
 Publications Ltd. Available through: Lund University Library website http://lub.lu.se 
 [Accessed 18 January 2015]. 
Masaki K., 2005. The Oppression/Emancipation Nexus in Ongoing Power Struggles: Village-
 Power Dynamics in Western Nepal, Journal of Development Studies, 42(5), pp:721-738. 
McPhee R., 2004. Clegg and Giddens on Power and (Post)Modernity. Management 
 Communication Quarterly, 18(1), pp:129-145. 
Mills A., Durepos G. and Wiebe E. (eds), 2010. Encyclopaedia of Case Study Research. 
 [e-book] London: SAGE Publications Ltd. Available through: Lund University Library 
 website http://lub.lu.se [Accessed 15 January 2015]. 
Ministry of Planning, 2015. Identification of Poor Households Programme. [web-page] 
 Available at: <http://www.mop.gov.kh/projects/idpoor/tabid/154/default.aspx> [Accessed
 16 January 2015]. 
Ministry of Planning, 2012. IDPoor Atlas – Identification of Poor Households. Available at: 
<http://www.mop.gov.kh> [Accessed: 18 January 2015]. 
Ministry of Planning, 2008. Implementation Manual on the Procedures for Identification of 
Poor Households. Available at: <http://www.mop.gov.kh> [Accessed: 16 January 2015]. 
Mosse D., 2013. The Anthropology of International Development. In: The Annual Review of 
Anthropology, 42, pp:227-246. 
Mosse D., 2010. A relational approach to durable poverty, inequality and power. In: Journal 
of Development Studies, 46, pp:1156-1178. 
 Stefanie Licht 
Masters of Science in Development Studies 
Graduate School & Department of Sociology 
 
58 
 
Moore D., 2005. Suffering for Territory: Race, Place, and Power in Zimbabwe. Durham, NC: 
 Duke University Press. 
Nuijeten M., 2005. Power in Practice: A Force Field Approach to Naturla Resource 
 Management. The Journals of Transdisciplinary Environmental Studies, 4(2), pp:1-14. 
Olivier de Sardan J.P., 2005. Anthropology and Development: Understanding Social Change. 
London: Zed.  
O’Reilly K., 2009. Key Concepts in Ethnography. [e-book] London: SAGE Publications Ltd.
  Available through: Lund University Library website http://lub.lu.se [Accessed 16 
 January 2015]. 
Rhoades R.E., 2006. Seeking half our brains: reflections on the social context of 
interdisciplinary research and development. In: Cernea M.M. and Kassam A.H. (eds). 
Researching the Culture in Agriculture: Social Research of International Development. 
Oxford: CABI Publishing.  
Richards P., 1995. Participatory rural appraisal: A quick and dirty critique. In: PLA Notes, 24, 
pp:13-16. 
Rossi B., 2004. Revisiting Foucauldian approaches: power dynamics in development projects. 
 In: Journal of Development Studies, 40, pp:1-29. 
Sadan E., 1997. Empowerment and Community Planning: Theory and Practice of People-
 Focused Social Solutions. Tel Aviv: Hakibbutz Hameuchad Publishers. 
Schwalbe M., Godwin S., Holden D., et al, 2000. Generic Processes in the Reproduction of 
 Inequality: An Interactionist Analysis. Social Force, 79(2), pp: 419-452. 
Strangio S., 2014. Hun Sen’s Cambodia. Chiang Mai: Silkworm Books.. 
Schwandt T., 2007. The SAGE Dictionary of Qualitative Inquiry. [e-book] 3
rd
 ed., London: 
 SAGE Publications Ltd. Available through: Lund University Library website 
 http://lub.lu.se [Accessed 10 February 2015]. 
Scott J., (ed.) 2001. Power: Critical Concepts. London:Routledge. 
Villerreal M., 1994. Wielding and Yielding: Power, Subordination and Gender Identity in the 
Context of a Mexican Development Project. PhD. Wageningen University and Research 
Centre.  
World Bank, n.d. Assessment of the Identification of Poor Households (IDPoor) Program’s 
 Procedures and Implementation. Unpublished study. 
 Stefanie Licht 
Masters of Science in Development Studies 
Graduate School & Department of Sociology 
 
59 
 
Wong J. and Poon M., 2010. Bringing Translations Out of the Shadows: Translation as an 
Issue of Methodological Significance in Cross-Cultural Qualitative Research. In: Journal 
of Transcultural Nursing, 21(2), pp:151.158. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Stefanie Licht 
Masters of Science in Development Studies 
Graduate School & Department of Sociology 
 
60 
 
Appendix 
 
Map 1: Map of Cambodia, indicating Kaoh Moan village within Takeo province 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Cambodia location map.svg: NordNordWestderivative work, Licensed under CCBY-
SA3.0 via Wikimedia Commons. 
